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"TAKING" THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY
SERIOUSLY: SEGMENTING PROPERTY
INTERESTS AND JUDICIAL REVISION
OF LEGISLATIVE JUDGMENTS
John A. Humbach*

I.

INTRODUCTION

On the day the Supreme Court decided Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,' Justice Antonin Scalia, who wrote the Lucas majority opinion, declared with plain chagrin: "The Imperial Judiciary lives." 2 He criticized his
"unelected, life-tenured" colleagues in the strongest terms for allowing the
Court to succumb to the "more natural direction" of its temptation-the
direction of "systematically eliminating checks upon its own power." 3 He
cited the fears of Lincoln that "if the policy of the Government upon vital
questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of
the Supreme Court, . . . the people will have ceased to be their own rulers,
having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands
of that eminent tribunal." 4
Lucas was brought by a land owner who lost the whole value of his ocean
front property as a result of a government regulation on beach development.5 For months, people concerned about property rights, the environment and "takings" had speculated on how the Supreme Court would deal
with Lucas's extreme facts. Then, on the very last day of the Court's term,
came Justice Scalia's tough words on judicial overstepping and his opinion in
Lucas. From Scalia's remarks it might have seemed that the time was nigh
* James D. Hopkins Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, White Plains,
New York.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
2. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2882 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 2874.
4. Id. at 2883 (quoting Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc.
No. 101-10, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 139 (1989)) (alterations in original).
5. Actually, it may be "highly questionable" whether the regulation in question actually
deprived Mr. Lucas of all of the land's value. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2995 (statement of Souter,
J.). This was, however, the South Carolina lower court's finding. Id. at 2890. The Supreme
Court accordingly decided Lucas under this factual assumption. Id. at 2896 n.9.
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for a resounding re-endorsement of the traditional authority of legislatures
to set public policy on problematic uses of land. It might have seemed that
the Supreme Court would at last rein in certain lower courts and their recent
forays into Takings Clause activism, putting an end to judicial preemption of
laws duly made under our nation's democratically-driven processes.
Alas, however, Justice Scalia's remarks were not in Lucas, but in another
case. What the Supreme Court did in Lucas itself was to reassign flat-out a
portion of this nation's ultimate environmental and land use authority from
the legislatures, which traditionally had it,6 to the courts. It did so by holding that the Takings Clause7 of the United States Constitution forbids state
legislatures to remedy defects in the common law of nuisance if the objectionable land uses happen to be the only marketable uses of the regulated
land.' As a result, the common law of nuisance has become a criterion of
"taking" when disaffected owners challenge land use legislation.
For hundreds of years, state legislatures and their parliamentary predecessors exercised the power to declare new kinds of public nuisance and add to
the list of socially intolerable uses of land as new needs became evident. 9 By
establishing common-law nuisance as a criterion of takings, the Supreme
Court has directed courts to reevaluate such legislative determinations in
light of the judiciary's own set of rules concerning land use rights and
6. See infra note 9 and text accompanying notes 38-41.
7. U.S. CONST. amend V. The Fifth Amendment provides: "[Nior shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.
8. In the Court's words, a regulation that takes "all economically productive or beneficial uses of land," Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901, "cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without
compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles
of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership." Id. at 2900.
When regulations do more than merely "duplicate the result that could have been achieved in
the courts" under common law, compensation must be paid. Id.
Although the Lucas Court specified background principles of property as well as nuisance, it
focused in its subsequent discussion solely on the common law of nuisance. Id. at 2901-02.
The distinctive background principles of property to which the Court referred remain unclear.
This Article likewise focuses on nuisance.
9. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S.
171 (1915). See generally J.R. Spencer, Public Nuisance-A Critical Examination, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 55 (1989) (discussing development of the public nuisance doctrine). The courts
have had that power too, of course, but courts are supposed to act case by case and follow
precedent-a generally restraining force when it comes to legal reform. See, e.g., Gorieb v.
Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927) (quoted infra text accompanying note 52); Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970) ("[Tlhe judicial establishment is neither
equipped ... nor prepared" to lay down effective pollution policy "as a by-product of private
litigation."). Therefore, as new needs become apparent, it has been "the great office of statutes
... to remedy defects in the common law... adapt[ing] it to the changes of time and circumstances." Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876). For a more detailed discussion see John
A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL
L. 1, 17-22 (1993); see also Joseph L. Sax, The ConstitutionalDimensions of Property.A Debate, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 23, 27-29 (1992).
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wrongs. In doing so, it has elevated the common law of nuisance-and the
judges who define it-to a new ascendancy over legislatures' traditional land
use authority, at least for the "relatively rare situations" 1 ° of "total regulatory takings""' to which Lucas applies.
There is indication that the Supreme Court may be inclined to expand the
range of cases in which its new nuisance criterion will apply.' 2 Prior to
Lucas, some lower federal courts had already begun to do their own judicial
reevaluations of legislatively determined land use policy.' 3 When these
courts found that their own perceptions of harm or balance differed from
those of the legislature, they declared the legislature's land use restrictions to
constitute takings that required the government to pay compensation. The
regulatory impacts in these cases did not necessarily rise to the level of the
total taking involved in Lucas. The question is whether the Supreme Court
will follow the lead of these courts and expand the range of takings cases in
which courts reconsider the same balance of factors, interests and policy
concerns that were before the legislature.
No one seems to disagree that some uses of private land are simply too
intolerable for the law to allow, and that society at large does not have a
duty to pay people to refrain from such intolerable uses. 4 The really diffi10. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894. The Court said that the cases of total takings to which
Lucas applied were "relatively rare situations" or "extraordinary circumstance[s]." Id. But
cf discussion infra text accompanying notes 142-43 (discussing the potential expansion of
Lucas's nuisance crtierion).
11. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
12. The most likely way that this would occur is through truncation or elimination of the
Court's longstanding no-segmentation rule, which requires that takings analysis be applied to
the parcel as a whole. See infra text accompanying notes 137-220 (discussing the no-segmentation rule and its application in the Claims Court). But cf Concrete Pipe & Prod., Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264 (1993) (reaffirming the no-segmentation
principle).
13. The cases discussed at length in this Article are Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United
States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989), corrected, 20 Cl. Ct. 324 (1990), aff'd, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991), Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381
(1988), and Florida Rock Industries v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985), aff'd in part, and
vacated in part, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987). See discussion infra text accompanying notes 68-122 and 170-97.
14. For example, writing for the majority in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), Justice Stevens wrote: "[S]ince no individual has a right to
use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm others, the State has not 'taken'
anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity." Id. at 491 n.20. Dissenting in the same case, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the state has "unquestioned authority to prevent a property owner from using his property to injure others without having to
compensate the value of the forbidden use." Id. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
Professor Epstein, an ardent critic of government impingements on private land use decisions, concedes that some uncompensated restrictions are appropriate. "The issue of compensation cannot arise until the question of justification has been disposed of." RICHARD A.
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cult and debatable questions relate to which particular land uses are properly
categorized as too intolerable to allow. Just because these questions are difficult and debatable does not, however, mean that courts, rather than legislatures, are better suited to have the final say.'" Yet, whenever courts presume
to apply criteria such as "nuisance" or even broader "balancing" criteria in
deciding cases of regulatory taking, they are implicitly transferring the ultimate authority to decide land use policy from the legislature to themselves.
This Article examines the diversion of the Takings Clause from its historic
limited role to that of a charter for courts to second-guess legislative determinations of land-use rights and wrongs. As we shall see, prior to Lucas the
Supreme Court and others following its lead have generally not regarded the
Takings Clause as a warrant for reaching de novo determinations on land use
problems and then substituting such judicial determinations, if different, for
those of the legislature.' 6 Some notable exceptions in the Claims Court and
Federal Circuit will then be considered along with the ostensible Supreme
Court authority, a sentence in Agins v. City of Tiburon. 17 The future importance of such activist review will be considered in light of the main barrier
still standing against it, the no-segmentation rule, which requires that the
impact of land use regulations be viewed in relation to the owner's property
"as a whole."'" Finally, against this background the Article will address the
question of the courts' proper role in supervising legislative judgments in the
land use field.' 9
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 199 (1985).

In the amicus brief he prepared in support of the owner in Lucas, Professor Epstein declined to
support an unconditional compensation requirement even for cases of total takings, pointing

out that "no balanced theory of takings could be that protective of private property against the
legitimate claims of the state." Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner at 23, Lucas (No. 91-453), reprintedin 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1233, 1249 (1992).
For further explanation see Richard A. Epstein, Ruminations on Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal CounciL. An Introduction to Amicus Curiae Brief, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1225, 1226
(1992).
15. Genuine conservative thinkers such as Robert Bork agree that substituting a court's
"sense of legislative prudence" for that of the elected legislature is not a proper remedy for
"failures of the legislative process, which certainly occur." ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING
OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 229 (1990). See generallyid. at 223-

40 (critiquing the views of Richard Epstein and Bernard Siegan, among others, and challenging the notion that the Takings Clause is a mandate for courts to overturn legislative policy
judgments they do not like).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 38-61.
17. 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980); see infra text accompanying and following notes 68-136.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 137-220.
19. See infra part IX.
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II.

THE PROPERTY RIGHTS DEBATE AND "TAKINGS"

For some years now, a debate over the property rights issue has been
growing. 2° At the heart of this debate is a difference of views about the
relative importance of private land-use autonomy, the right of owners to use
their land as they please versus the right of communities or the federal government to protect the landbase on which all must depend for national wellbeing and survival.2 ' Implicit in the support for the expanding body of environmental and land-use regulations is the view that such regulations provide
a necessary, albeit imperfect protection for natural, community and other
shared resources that are vulnerable to poorly planned development or
shortsighted utilization and destruction. 22 On the other side of the debate,
there are views that range from the position that current government regula20. For a good synopsis of the debate and its philosophical underpinnings, see Gregory S.
Alexander, Takings and the Post-Modern Dialectic of Property, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 259
(1992). My own depiction of the property rights debate may be found in John A. Humbach,
What is Behind the "PropertyRights" Debate?, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 21 (1992).
See also Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752
(1988), explaining this debate as a reflection of different political visions about "who holds
power and how those who hold power use it." Id. at 1753. Professor Alexander describes a
struggle for power parity or superiority in land use decisions between private landowners and
government regulators who are allegedly acting in the public interest. This Article is about the
struggle for power parity or superiority in law-making decisions between elected legislatures
and judges who might have voted to elect somebody else as legislators. The two stories intersect when groups with conflicting desires, such as development-oriented landowners and environmentalists, acquire allies on the substantive issues in different branches of government.
21. In fact, for many decades laws have substantially restricted the autonomy of the great
majority of land owners, the urban and suburban owners. The practical effect of the zoning
laws applicable to most urban and suburban parcels is to restrict the uses of those parcels to
the existing uses for which the parcels were already adapted at the time the owner bought
them. Only rural owners in areas not covered by zoning have been largely free to alter the uses
and character of their lands. A primary focus of the property rights debate is whether rural
land owners should be asked to play by the same rules that urban and suburban landowners
have played by for decades.
For a discussion of the need for and constitutionality of "existing-use zoning" for privatelyowned rural open spaces, see John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN L.
REV. 339 (1989). But cf James B. Wadley & Pamela Falk, Lucas and Environmental Land
Use ControlsIn Rual Areas: Whose Land is it Anyway? 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 331 (1993)
(drawing heavily on the alleged psychological needs of rural landowners for land-use
autonomy).
22. See supra note 20; see also, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The Fallacies of Free Market
Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 371 (1992) (critiquing the view that serious
environmental damage can be best avoided by relying on private market incentives alone);
Lynda L. Butler, Private Land Use, Changing Public Values and Notions of Relativity, 1992
B.Y.U. L. REV. 629 (1992) (stating that the need for reallocating land use rights to account for
third party interests has been ignored by the traditional private property system of absolute,
exploitative use); Lynton K. Caldwell, Rights of Ownership or Rights of Use?-The Need for a
New ConceptualBasisfor Land Use Policy, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759 (1974) (proposing a
radically revised system of land use rights imposing limitations well beyond the traditional
restrictions of nuisance law).
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tions are excessive to the conviction that trying to enhance social welfare by
land use regulation is just plain wrong.23
In the debate over the growing body of government environmental and
land-use regulation, defenders of private property rights often invoke the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2 4 The Clause is invoked to argue
that regulatory impingement on private land use and on land value is not
merely a bad idea, but that it is an unconstitutional one.2 5
The Takings Clause protects property. It declares that the government
shall not take private property for public use without just compensation.26
Because the Takings Clause protects property, it seems a plausible assumption that the Clause may have at least some bearing on the legality of government regulations on land use, especially regulations that severely impact on
private economic interests. However, interpreting the Takings Clause to
limit regulation appears ahistorical, contrary to both the intentions of the
Framers and to the understanding of most 19th century judges.27 Historically, "taking" meant physical taking.28 It does not even appear that philo23. See supra note 20; see also, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE
MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 9-23

(1991) (discussing the difficulty of assigning objective

value to all aspects of land use rights); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING
221-27 (1972) (stating that zoning laws should not be constitutionally protected because they
do not fit within basic property concepts); Bernard H. Siegan, The Anomaly of Regulation

Under the Taking Clause, in

PLANNING WITHOUT PRICES

33-47 (Bernard H. Siegan ed.,

1977) (advocating interpreting the Takings Clause to invalidate zoning); Robert C. Ellickson,
Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI.
L. REV 681 (1973) (examining cost-internalizing systems as alternatives to zoning); Richard
A. Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil Right, 29 CAL. W.L. REv. 187, 200-07 (1992)
(discussing the legislative and administrative processes that generate inefficient regulations).
24. See supra note 7.
25. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, Introduction: UtilitarianBalancing and Formalism in
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (1988) ("The takings clause seems to be the ideal
remedy for these regulatory excesses.").
26. See supra note 7.
27. "[Elarly constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all ...." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2900
n.15 (1992); see also Scott M. Reznick, Comment, Land Use Regulation and the Concept of
Takings in Early Nineteenth Century America, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 854, 861 (1973) (reviewing
cases in which compensation was not required where there was not a physical invasion); William M. Treanor, Note, The Originsand OriginalSignificance of the Just Compensation Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985) (reviewing evidence that James
Madison and his contemporaries intended the Takings Clause to apply only to direct physical
takings by the federal government).
28. As late as 1897, the Supreme Court still held the view, based on an " 'immense weight
of authority,' " that there had to be a "'physical invasion of the real estate'" in order for a
compensable taking to occur. Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1897) (quoting
Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1879) (holding that non-physical interferences
"are universally held not to be a taking" under the Takings Clause)).
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sophical forerunners of the clause's ideology, such as John Locke,

9

would

have asserted a regulation-limiting role for the clause. "For it would be a
direct contradiction," Locke wrote, "for any one to enter into society with
others for securing and regulating of property, and yet to suppose his land
...should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government to which he

himself, and the property of the land, is a subject." 3 °
Nevertheless, since the early 1920s, the Supreme Court's conception of
"takings" has included not only physical invasions by government, directly
or indirectly, but also so-called "regulatory takings" 3 1-takings that can result when regulations go "too far" and impinge on private freedom. 3 2 Physi29. For whom the "great and chief end" of government was "the preservation of...
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, § 124, at 350-51 (Peter Laslett
ed., 1988) (1690).
30. 2 id. § 120 at 349. "By the same Act therefore, whereby any one unites his Person,
which was before free, to any Commonwealth; by the same he unites his possessions, which
were before free, to it also; and they become, both of them, person and Possession, subject to
the Government and Dominion of that Commonwealth, as long as it hath a being." 2 id.
31. The seminal case on regulatory takings was Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922). It held that a prohibition on mining certain coal went "too far" and
amounted to a taking, even though the technical ownership and possession of the coal was not
disturbed. Id. at 415-16.
Even though Pennsylvania Coal is widely regarded as a property-protection case par excellence, it was actually a case of owner versus owner, and one of the property owners lost. The
Court went far to protect the rights of coal companies, creating a whole new constitutional
doctrine in the process, but it showed scant concern for preventing destruction of the property
of ordinary homeowners: "This is the case of a single private house. No doubt there is a public
interest even in this .... [but not] a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the [coal company's] constitutionally protected rights." Id. at 413-14. What Pennsylvania Coal actually did was to find that the property rights of owners of large amounts of
property outweighed the property rights of mere homeowners. The widespread enthusiasm for
a case such as Pennsylvania Coal among the self-styled defenders of "property rights" may tell
much about their underlying agendas.
32. Technically, land use restrictions do not normally take property "rights" in the strict
Hohfeldian sense, see Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-58 (1913), but rather they take or limit the owner's
"freedom" to use the land in particular ways. Taking or restricting freedoms is, of course, the
very essence of legislation regulating conduct; taking freedoms is, in other words, an unavoidable concomitant of creating legal "rights." Consider, for example, Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257, 261 (1964), which upheld the creation of a civil right
to non-discriminatory service at places of public accommodation by cutting back on private
owners' freedom to exclude, "a fundamental element of the property right." Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979). A larger example is the creation of the basic
property right to exclude (via the tort and crime of trespass), by legally curtailing the natural
freedom of human beings to walk the earth.
Taking away legal "rights," once the government has created them, is a much rarer effect of
legislation than is taking away freedoms. Moreover, in cases where "rights" in the strict
Hohfeldian sense have been taken "for public use," the Supreme Court has invariably required
that just compensation be paid. See John A. Humbach, A Unifying Theory For the Just Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 251-61 (1982)

property." 2
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cal takings differ from regulatory takings, and have received different
treatment by the courts in significant respects. For example, when analyzing
physical takings, the Supreme Court employs a bright line test under which
permanent physical invasions of private property are compensable takings
per se. 33 By contrast, the tests for regulatory takings are hazy.34
One reason that the tests for regulatory takings are less precise is, of
course, that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without" compensation. 35 Unlike
an uncompensated physical taking, uncompensated regulations are not inherently wrong, even when the application of the regulations affects private
land values and uses.3 6
(including a full discussion of the distinction between rights and freedoms, and what this can
tell us about the interests that the Takings Clause really protects).
33. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Despite the
Supreme Court's categorical language, miscellaneous exceptions still surround the per se rule
for permanent physical invasions. There are, for example, the difficult to reconcile situations
in which the government effects permanent physical expropriations of private property for the
benefit of other private individuals rather than for "public use." See John A. Humbach, ConstitutionalLimits on the Power to Take Private Property.PublicPurpose and Public Use, 66 OR.
L. REV. 547 (1987). A recent dramatic example is the change in community property laws
that eliminates the husband's rights of disposition as " 'head and master,' " which occasioned
an expropriation by the Supreme Court itself in Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456
(1981) (holding that the "'head and master' " provision violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
The constitutionality of statutory forfeitures of lands and chattels, irrespective of the
owner's guilt, provides another apparent exception to the per se rule for physical invasions.
See Humbach, supra note 9, at 2 n. 11. The theory of statutory forfeiture is that "lawmakers,
in the exercise of the police power, [are] free to determine that certain uses of property [are]
undesirable" and then to adopt confiscation as a " 'secondary defense against [the] forbidden
use.'' Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974) (quoting Van
Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467 (1926)).
34. [O]ur decision in Mahon offered little insight into when, and under what circumstances, a given regulation would be seen as going "too far" for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment. In 70-odd years of succeeding "regulatory takings" jurisprudence, we have generally eschewed any "set formula" for determining how far is too
far, preferring to "engag[e] in ... essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992) (quoting Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (alteration in original)).
Compared with cases of physical occupation, the Claims Court has written:
When an alleged taking is due to a statutory or regulatory restriction,... the issue is
more complex and, as is true in many areas of the law, is not resolved by a bright line
test. Rather, in determining if a restriction actually results in a taking, the court
must consider the facts and circumstances of each particular case and make an ad
hoc determination ....

Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394, 399 (1989), corrected, 20 Cl. Ct. 324
(1990), aff'd, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991).
35. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
36. Even in Lucas-perhaps the high point to date of the modern Supreme Court's solicitude for private owners' rights-the Court made clear that "government may ... affect prop-
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The focus of attention in regulatory takings cases is whether the legislature had the power to apply regulatory measures to property as opposed to
achieving its objective by condemnation of the property with compensation.
Judges who make the decisions about such legislative powers must inevitably
do so against the background of their own views concerning the protection
and exploitation of the nation's land and natural resources. These views

may not agree with those of the legislative majority. Accordingly, there is
the constant risk that regulatory takings cases can glide imperceptibly into
decisions reallocating ultimate public policy choices from the legislature to
the courts.
III.

SCOPE OF REGULATORY TAKINGS REVIEW: THE TRADITION

Protecting the rights of private owners is one of the important goals of our
society, but it is not the only goal. Almost all private land uses are likely to
have some negative spill-over effects on other owners or other important
societal goals. 37 For these reasons, many diverse factors, interests and policy
concerns enter into a consideration of which land uses should, despite their
externalities, be allowed and which uses are, on balance, too intolerable for
the law to allow.

One of the foundational principles of our nation's Constitution is that,
primarily, it is for the legislatures to make the laws that decide among competing factors, interests and policy concerns, and courts are to follow the
legislatures' lead in their determinations of right and wrong. 38 "Power to
erty values by regulation without incurring an obligation to compensate-a reality we
nowadays acknowledge explicitly." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897.
37. "Practically all human activities unless carried on in a wilderness interfere to some
extent with others or involve some risk of interference .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 822 cmt. g. (1977); see also Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public
Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971) (discussing the takings implications of governmental actions
dealing with such spill-over effects).
38. This Article does not attempt a structured defense of the position that legislatures
rather than courts should have the final say in public land use policy. Rather, the Article
accepts the Supreme Court's holdings that elected legislatures are the nation's primary lawmaking bodies. The Article further assumes that judges should not yield to activist temptations to override legislative land use policies whose substantive merits they disagree with. For
an argument that the traditional constitutional allocation of lawmaking power is a good one,
drawing on political process theory and the work of John Hart Ely, see Douglas T. Kendall,
Note, The Limits to Growth and the Limits to the Takings Clause, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 547,
557-62 (1992).
There is, of course, a well-recognized exception to legislative supremacy in the special case
of fundamental rights. "In a long series of cases [the Supreme] Court has held that where
fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by the States simply on
a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a
proper state purpose." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
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determine such questions, so as to bind all, must exist somewhere; ....
Under our system that power is lodged with the legislative branch of the
government.", 39 And "in this particular a large discretion is necessarily
vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such
4
interests." 1
The unsuitability of subjecting legislative decisions "to ex post facto judicial assessment of 'the public interest' " is particularly great in the economic
sphere where "[t]he fact is that virtually all economic regulation benefits
some segments of the society and harms others" and "determination of 'the
public interest'.. .. entails not merely economic and mathematical analysis
but value judgment. '41 Nonetheless, when a legislative decision does not
seem right, it is only human nature to think that the legislative process perhaps did not get all the factors quite right, that it did not give due weight to
all important considerations, and that a different balance, a finer balance,
might be conducive to a more amenable result.
Until its holding in Lucas, the Supreme Court had consistently eschewed
any such judicial re-balancing of legislative determinations in the land use
field. The Court's opinion in Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co. ,42 the
seminal case that upheld zoning, set the tone. In Euclid, the Supreme Court
related at some length the many considerations that the legislature might
have had in mind in adopting the zoning regulations at issue. The Court
noted the presence of factors such as promoting the health and security of
However, an owner's right to use property as he or she pleases is not recognized as a
fundamental right, nor could it be because, among other things: (1) If a right is "fundamental," then presumably everybody should have it in more or less equal quantities (e.g., recognized fundamental rights such as speech, religion, and voting), but rights to use the material
world are not equally distributed nor, probably, should they be, and (2) a right to use one's
land as one pleases would often interfere with another's right to use his or her land. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding a requirement that certain cedar trees be
destroyed in order to prevent the spread of arboreal disease to nearby apple trees). It is hard to
imagine how such unequal and constantly colliding rights, in continual need of adjustment and
amendment relative to each other, could be considered fundamental.
But compare Epstein, supra note 23, at 187, in which Professor Epstein argues that property
rights are fundamental because of their utility (which no one can deny-but then, most rights
have utility) and because of their "universality." Id. at 188-94. Epstein does not, however,
include rules guaranteeing free use of property among the universal property rules he regards
as essential to property and, quite the opposite, he concedes that "ownership of property does
not confer the untrammelled right to do with it what one pleases." Id. at 202. In the end,
Professor Epstein does not conclude that there is a "fundamental" right to use property as one
pleases.
39. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887).
40. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894).
41. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1344, 1352 (1991)
(upholding restrictive billboard regulations against antitrust challenge).
42. 272 U.S. 365, 391-95 (1926).
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children,4 3 facilitating fire control," preventing "disorder," 4 5 reducing residential area traffic and preventing near-nuisances, 46 as well as the effects of
diverting "natural development., 47 However, the Court specifically held
that "these reasons, thus summarized do not demonstrate the wisdom or
sound policy" of the use restrictions in question.4 8
Very possibly, the Court was not convinced by the legislative rationales
that it "summarized." ' 49 The Court did not, however, need to be convinced.
To uphold the zoning ordinance at hand nothing more was necessary than
that "the reasons [be] sufficiently cogent to preclude [the Court] from saying,
as it must be said before the ordinance can be declaredunconstitutional, that
such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial
relation to" police-power purposes.5"
In short, the Court's approach in Euclid was to recite the legislative rationales but not to re-evaluate or re-weigh those rationales. It summarized the
legislature's reasons primarily to demonstrate that the legislature had reasons in support of its legislative judgment. During the nearly seven decades
since Euclid, the Court has repeatedly evinced a similarly deferential approach to legislative judgments about which land uses need to be prohibited
and which should be allowed.5 1 The Court's opinions often refer to the reasons underlying the legislation at issue, but the Court has not made an in43. Id. at 391.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 391, 395.
47. Id. at 389-90.
48. Id. at 395 (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. Id. (emphasis added). The other important prong of modem takings analysis, the
effect of any of the specific restraints of the regulations on value or marketability, was not
disclosed in the pleadings. Id. at 397. The Court's focus and the approach that it demonstrated was therefore limited to the legitimate governmental interest issue. Id.
51. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding a
ban on use as adult theater against First Amendment free-expression challenge even though
utilizing a more rigorous standard than most land use regulations); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1980) (upholding development density restrictions to prevent ill effects
of urbanization); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding restrictions on
number of unrelated occupants in a house); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962) (upholding prohibition on continued mining of gravel pit); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S.
272 (1928) (upholding prohibition on maintaining ornamental cedar trees); Gorieb v. Fox, 274
U.S. 603 (1927) (upholding setback restrictions that prohibit structures on certain reserved
open space portions of building lots).
In the period following Euclid, the Supreme Court roundly rejected the turn-of-the-century
Lochnerian approach, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), of closely reviewing economic legislation generally. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (rational basis test);
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see also Day-Brite Lighting, 342 U.S. at
423 (stating that the Court "do[es] not sit as a super-legislature").
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dependent re-evaluation of the rationales. As the Court has explained:
"State Legislatures and city councils, who deal with the situation from a
practical standpoint, are better qualified than the courts to determine the
necessity, character and degree of regulation which these new and perplexing conditions require; and their conclusions should not be disturbed .... ""
Twelve years prior to Lucas, the Supreme Court "crystallized its thinking" 53 about regulatory takings in land use cases, establishing what has become the dominant regulatory-takings formulation for such cases-the twopronged test of regulatory takings from Agins v. City of Tiburon. 5" In its
articulation of the two-pronged test, the Court stated: "The application of a
general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance
[(a)] does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, or [(b)] denies
an owner economically viable use of his land." 55 The Court has interpreted
the two prongs of this test so that neither prong stands as an invitation or
authorization for courts to trench on the legislature's traditional constitutional prerogative to make the ultimate decisions about land use rights and
wrongs.56

The first prong of the Agins test, (those ordinances which "do[ ] not substantially advance legitimate state interests") is a rule about the subject-matter limits of lawmaking power.57 As the Court has made clear, however, "a
52. Gorieb, 274 U.S. at 608 (emphasis added) (upholding setback restrictions that prohibit
structures on certain reserved open space portions of building lots); see also supra text accompanying note 41 (quoting City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct.
1344, 1352 (1991)).
53. Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210, 1213 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (citing Agins, 447 U.S. at
260), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
54. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
55. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
56. See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (applying test so as not to interfere with
legislative judgment). An arguable exception is Justice Scalia's comment in footnote 3 of the
majority opinion in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.3 (1987),
suggesting that the standard of review for takings claims is not the same deferential rational
basis test that applies to due process and equal protection claims: "To the contrary, our verbal
formulations in the takings field have generally been quite different. We have required that the
regulation 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state interest .... .'" Id.; see supra note 50
and accompanying text (explaining the rational basis test). However, the Court's holding in
Nollan was based primarily on its conclusion that the governmental action "utterly fail[ed] to
further the end advanced as the justification." Id. at 837. Therefore, the remarks in footnote 3
were, at most, dicta.
57. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-62 (discussing whether zoning action was within city's
power). The outer contours of the legislative police power are obviously not suitable for any
fixed delineation:
"Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the extent and boundaries of the
police power, and however difficult it may be to render a satisfactory definition of it,
there seems to be no doubt that it does extend to the protection of the lives, health
and property of the citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the public
morals."
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broad range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfies the[ ] requirements [of legitimate state interest].""8 Furthermore, judicial "inquiry
into legislative purpose is not intended as a license to judge the effectiveness
of legislation," the constitutional question being only whether the legislature
" 'rationally could have believed that [the enactment] would promote its objective.' "59 In short, as this prong of the Agins test has been interpreted and
applied, it is fully consistent with the Supreme Court's deferential approach
to legislative policy setting. Irrespective of a measure's "merit" or "wisdom," or whether the court is convinced that the legislative balance is a
good one, land-use regulations adopted by the legislature will pass the first
prong if their purpose falls within the "broad range" and they substantially
advance their purpose.
It is likewise for the second Agins prong-if the ordinance "denies an
owner economically viable use." Irrespective of the merit, wisdom or even
legitimacy of legislative purpose, the legislature does not have the power to
enact a measure that deprives owners, without compensation, of economically viable use of their land. The second prong defines the legislative power
to remedy social ills in terms of current market values of land. A test that
hinges the legislature's constitutional authority on the vagaries of supply and
demand may have much to say against it, but it is at least a test of legislative
competence that is not based on the merit, wisdom or correct balance, in the
Court's view, of the legislative action in question.'
The Supreme Court's deference in the land use field has not been a complete abdication. On the contrary, recent decisions demonstrate clearly that
even with the traditional deference to legislatures' land-use policies, courts
retain ample room to address egregious cases of non-fit between government
acts and "legitimate state interests." In Nollan v. California Coastal ComLeisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 129 (1890) (quoting Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 32-

33 (1878)).
"The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.... The values it represents
are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power
of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled."
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 6 (1974) (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,

32-33 (1954)).
58. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35.
59. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 511 n.3 (1987)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984)
(emphasis deleted)).
60. Perhaps the worst thing about making the economically viable use factor into a categorical test of taking, as occurred in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886
(1992), is that doing so practically necessitates having the Lucas nuisance criterion as an escape valve for really bad land uses, thus elevating judicial determinations of land-use rights
and wrongs over those made by the democratically elected legislature.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 42:771

mission,6 for example, the Court struck down a requirement that an owner
dedicate an easement as a condition to getting a building permit. It did so
on the ground that "this case does not meet even the most untailored standards" of nexus between the government's alleged purpose and the regulatory action taken.6 2 Similarly, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc.,63 the Court invalidated a special permit requirement for a group home
on the ground that "the record [did] not reveal any rational basis" for the
special permit requirement.'

Nevertheless, in both Cleburne and Nollan the Court made it abundantly
clear that the finer tuning of the land-use policy balance is a job for the
legislature. 65 Even in Lucas, the Court acknowledged "our contemporary
understanding of the broad realm within which government may regulate
without compensation," so long as the regulation does not effect a " 'total
taking.'

"66

Lucas was, however, a turning point.

By adopting a common-law nuisance criterion for regulatory legitimacy,
the Supreme Court in Lucas has made a formal inroad into its longstanding
policy of deference to legislatively determined balances in the land-use field.
The Court has endorsed the propriety, at least in cases of total takings, of
courts revisiting and revising legislative land-use judgments.

67

The fact that

achieving a public objective has extreme economic impacts on particular
owners has become a cue for judicial intercession and prima facie proof that
the legislature's weighing went awry.
61.

483 U.S. 825, 838-39 (1987).

62. Id. at 838.
63. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
64. Id. at 448.
65. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35 (observing that "a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations" will satisfy the legitimate state interest requirement); Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 440 (observing that "[w]hen social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude, and the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes." (citations omitted)).
66. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897, 2901 (1992).
67. Indeed, this is precisely what happened on remand in Lucas itself. The South Carolina Supreme Court held the state liable to the owner for a temporary taking, stating: "Coastal
Council has not persuaded us that any common law basis exists by which it could restrain
Lucas's desired use of his land; nor has our research uncovered any'such common law principle." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C.) (order on remand),
rev'd, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
The Supreme Court has, in addition, warned lower courts against being swayed by imaginative thinking, or public policy hints from the legislature, in deciding what is prohibited by the
common law of nuisance for purposes of takings adjudication. It stressed that laws falling
within Lucas nuisance review "may be defended only if an objectively reasonableapplication of
relevant precedents would exclude those [statutorily prohibited] beneficial uses in the circumstances in which the land is presently found." Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2902 n.18.
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REWEIGHING LEGISLATIVE JUDGEMENTS IN THE CLAIMS COURT
AND FEDERAL CIRCUIT

The two-pronged Agins test of regulatory taking sets boundaries on legislative power based on criteria unconcerned with the reviewing court's view
of the merit, wisdom or correctness of balance embodied in the particular
legislation in question. It is, however, another thing altogether for a court to
decide that the legislature lacked power to prohibit particular activities just
because, in the court's own view, the activities targeted by the legislature are
not, on balance, detrimental enough to ban.
The United States Claims Court's first decision in Loveladies Harbor,Inc.
v. United States6 8 provides an excellent example of this latter sort of reasoning. The decision is one of several recent holdings in which the Claims
Court (now the United States Court of Federal Claims) has placed itself
squarely among those courts willing to become actively involved in "ex post
facto judicial assessment of 'the public interest' "69 by revisiting the legislative balancing process. In two other cases, Whitney Benefits v. United
States70 and Florida Rock Industries v. United States,7 the Claims Court
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, respectively,
performed similar re-evaluations of the balance established by Congress in
enacting the legislation under review.7 2
68. 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988), later proceeding, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990). In another proceeding,
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 375 (1988), the Claims Court discussed a
point unrelated to the present discussion.
69. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1344, 1352 (1991)
(discussed supra note 41 and accompanying text).
70. 18 Cl. Ct 394 (1989), corrected, 20 Cl. Ct. 324 (1990), aff'd, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991).
71. 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1053 (1987). This decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit modified the Claims Court decision
found at 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985).
72. Two 1992 Claims Court decisions touched much more briefly on the re-balancing
issue, with opposite reactions. In Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992), a wetlands
fill-permit denial case, the court rejected the government's defense of Congress's act stating
that "[p]laintiffs' proposed development simply did not present the extreme threat to public
health, safety and welfare which precluded the payment of compensation in those [earlier]
cases," id. at 340 (emphasis added), referring to Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), and
Allied-General Nuclear Services, Inc. v. United States, 839 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (nuclear hazard). The implication that Congress can regulate without compensation only to prevent "extreme threats" goes well beyond general contemporary understanding. However, in B
& F Trawlers, Inc. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 299 (1992), the Court of Federal Claims
declined the plaintiff's invitation to re-balance considerations of public interest determined by
Congress, quoting an earlier Supreme Court case, to the effect that ..... debatable questions as
to reasonableness are not for the courts but for the legislature .... Id. at 305 (quoting Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962) (quoting Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S.
374, 388 (1932))).
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Loveladies was a wetlands case, brought after the Army Corps of Engineers denied an owner/developer a permit under the Clean Water Act 73 to
fill wetlands for development. 74 The denial reduced the value of 12.5 acres
by over 99%.75 The Claims Court said it had to do its own evaluation of the
balance of relevant interests under the "legitimate governmental interest"
prong of the two-prong Agins. 76 The legitimate governmental interest could
not be satisfied, the court said, merely by an "inten[tion] to promote a public
benefit." ' 77 Rather, "[t]his determination must also involve the court's
weighing of that intended public benefit against the harm inflicted upon the
78
landowner involved."
The government's intended public benefit, explained the court, was "the
preservation of wetlands as a productive and valuable resource ....

Weigh-

ing against this public interest is the plaintiff's right to fill and develop their
land.",79 Presumably, Congress had already balanced both of these obviously relevant interests in enacting the permit requirement in the first
place. 8' The court did not, however, discuss the possibility of such congressional weighing, but instead proceeded to weigh the interests itself.
The court pointed out that the owner's land had suffered a large reduction
in value. 8' By contrast, "the pollution caused by plaintiff" in filling the wetlands "cannot be considered harmful since the possible pollution is of a kind
that is merely incidental to any human action undertaken." 82 In short, the
regulation created a significant private burden and, according to the court's
"ex post facto judicial assessment of 'the public interest,'
an inconsiderable public gain.
Although, the Claims Court noted, other jurisdictions had found the balance in favor of the governmental interest in preserving wetlands,8 4 "[w]hen
the Federal Circuit balanced the governmental interest in preserving wet73. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993). Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987), prohibits discharge of dredged or fill material into the waters of the United States without a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers.
74. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 383 (1988).
75. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 160 (1990).
76. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980)). Agins said nothing,
however, about weighing benefit "against" harm-a point discussed infra text accompanying
and following notes 123-36.
79. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388.
80. Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 108 (1909) ("These are matters which it must be presumed were known by the legislature ....
81. Id.
82. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 389.
83. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1344, 1352 (1991)
(quoted more fully supra text accompanying note 41).
84. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388, 395.
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lands against the loss of value to the landowner's property, the Federal Circuit found that the balance fell in favor of the landowner."' , The Claims
Court followed, as it must, the holding of the Federal Circuit. 6
The Federal Circuit case cited by the Loveladies court was Florida Rock
Industries v. United States, 7 another judicial re-balancing case in which the
court decided that the public interest in preserving wetlands was outweighed
by the private owner's interest in destroying them. Interestingly, the Florida
Rock court concluded that the balance favored the landowner by applying
the so-called harm/benefit distinction, 8 a long intriguing quasi-distinction
that the Supreme Court later found feckless in Lucas. 9 The problem with
the harm/benefit distinction is that "the distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulation is often in the eye of the beholder....
Whether one or the other of the competing characterizations will come to
one's lips in a particular case depends primarily upon one's evaluation of the
worth of competing uses of the real estate." 90
85. Id. at 388 (citing Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987)).
86. Id. at 395; see also id. at 399 ("Upon examination of the regulation's public purpose,
plaintiffs have shown that their private interest in developing and utilizing their property outweighs the public value in preserving these wetlands." (emphasis added)).
The Loveladies court stated at one point that it was "reluctant" to rely on the balancing of
the private interest against the public interest because there are problems with using the harm/
benefit distinction (discussed immediately below), and because such "overall balancing . . is
generally not a useful guideline for making a takings determination." Id. at 389 (citation
omitted).
The court apparently overcame its reluctance, and followed the Federal Circuit's balancing
precedent. Id. at 395. Even more to the point, the court wrote in a subsequent opinion: "It is
this court's judgment that the drastic economic impact on plaintiffs' property, coupled with the
court's earlier determination of a lack of a countervailing substantial legitimate state interest,
forms the basis for finding that there has been a taking." Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 160 (1990) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
87. 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987).
88. Id. at 900-01. The gist of the harm/benefit distinction is that " 'the state takes property by eminent domain because it is useful to the public, and under the police power because it
is harmful ....From this results the difference between the power of eminent domain and the

police power, that the former recognizes a right to compensation, while the latter on principle
does not.' " Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Wis. 1972) (quoting ERNST
FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 511, at 546-47 (1904) (omission by court)).
89. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112. S.Ct. 2886, 2897-98 (1992). The
Court had previously attempted to bury the distinction. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133 n.30 (1978) (citing Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964)).

90. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2897-98.
Even though the harm/benefit distinction does not have the rigorous analytical power sometimes attributed to it, the distinction nonetheless has great rhetorical power. The twin concepts of "harm-preventing" and "benefit-conferring" are intelligibly different in everyday
speech. As a matter of convention, people normally use expressions such as "avoid harm" and
"receive benefit" to refer to very different things. Although the harm/benefit distinction has
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The Federal Circuit invoked the harm/benefit distinction in FloridaRock
in order to deal with a weird analytical problem in the original opinion by
the Claims Court below. 9 ' The analytical problem resulted because, among
its reasons for holding the government liable, the Claims Court had included
a determination that the owner's proposed activities would not cause pollution. If, however, the owner's activities truly would not cause pollution,
then the Army Corps would not have had jurisdiction-meaning that the
"taking" found by the Claims Court could not have occurred.92
The Federal Circuit's remedy to this conundrum was straightforward: it
held that there was "de jure pollution," 93 securing jurisdiction, but found
that any actual pollution would not be "very serious" 94 and was not the
government's real concern.9" It then dealt with the government's "almost

exclusive[ ]" concern, protecting the wetland, by means of a balancing of
"private and public interests."'9 6 It said that the plaintiff's "pro forma" 97
pollution did no harm and that protecting the wetland was not preventing a
harm, which the government could do without compensation,9 8 but was
rather a "public good." 99 A public purpose to avoid harm might have outrhetorical power, it lacks analytical power because expressions such as "avoiding harms" or
"receiving benefits" each can be made to refer to the conventional referents of the other. (E.g.,
"He provided me the benefit of not kicking me"; or "she harmed the mugger by hiding some of
her money from him.")
Despite its discrediting in Lucas, the harm/benefit distinction still has enormous power to
express a differentiation that everyone can and does make every day, even if the distinction is a
little too slippery to serve as a bright line delineator for constitutional analysis.
91. Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986), aff'g in part
and vacating in part 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985).
92. Id. at 898-90.
93. Id. at 899. By electing to proceed in the Claims Court, the plaintiff conceded Army
Corps jurisdiction-hence, de jure pollution.
94. Id. at 904. The Federal Circuit found that expected pollution impacts would be
"'short term' " and would " 'not appear to be a problem' " for nearby wells. Id.
True, the court appeared to be quoting a witness, perhaps the Army Corps district engineer,
on these points, as well as for the conclusion that the pollution would not be "very serious."
Id. This is not, however, a redeeming factor inasmuch as such witnesses have no more authority than the court to decide that Congress's goals are of little weight or merit. The Army
Corps might have legitimately considered such points in deciding whether to grant the permit,
see 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1992), and the court might have considered them to decide if the
permit denial was arbitrary and capricious, but these were not the purposes for which the
points were raised in Florida Rock. They were raised and used to challenge congressional
policy written into the Clean Water Act.
95. Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 904.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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weighed the owner's interestl °° but, the Federal Circuit concluded, a public
purpose to secure benefit would not. In sum, the method used by the Federal Circuit to determine the validity of Congress's decision to protect wetlands via regulation (as opposed to purchase) was to put the public's
interests in balance against the owner's burden, and it found the "private
interest much more deserving of compensation. '"' 0 '
The core objection to the balancing methodology of these two wetlands
cases, Loveladies and Florida Rock, is its displacement of policy making
power. Ultimate social outcomes are made to turn on the relative weight
that a court, rather than Congress, ascribed to the Clean Water Act's purposes of preventing pollution and keeping dredged and fill materials out of
wetlands. 0 2 Unlike Congress, the Federal Circuit did not see any public
"harm" at all in dredge or fill operations in wetlands, and it greatly discounted the associated pollution and resulting " 'short term' " "turbidity. '"103 Similarly, the Claims Court believed that the type of pollution
entailed in filling wetlands "cannot be considered harmful,"'" a view directly at odds with the view expressed by Congress in enacting the Clean
Water Act.' 5
Of course, it is fair for people to disagree about such things as the
harmfulness of pollution or discharging fill into wetlands. Only a few decades ago, wetlands were little appreciated and natural waterbodies were
usual places to disperse unwanted substances. "[Clhanged circumstances or
'
new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so, "106
but change needs time to be understood. There is often an interim, as seems
to be the case with wetlands, when many do not agree that knowledge or
circumstances have really changed at all. Given that reasonable people disagree about how much "harm" there is in short term pollution or in dredging
100. The court provided as an example a law that frustrates a person "who wanted to put
toxic wastes in drinking water." Id.
101. Id.
102. See S. REP. No. 95-370, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.74 (1977) (outlining the purpose of the
Clean Water Act's dredge and fill permit requirements), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326,
4399.
103. Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 904. Compare the Florida Rock court's following
discussion:
One who remembers when wetlands were called swamps, when their draining or
filling was deemed progress, and when their main environmental impact was in the
production of noxious disease-bearing mosquitos, and who has observed their present
status, will not be astonished if some day a mosquito bred in a swamp bites someone
and infects him with malaria, and the old beliefs revive.
Id. at 902.
104. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 389 (1988).
105. Cf supra note 102 (citing the legislative history of the Clean Water Act).
106. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 cmt. g (1979)).
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and filling wetlands, whose values should be written into legal policy? Who
should make the "value judgment" that, as Justice Scalia recently reminded
us, lies behind "determination of 'the public interest' ?1o7
In Loveladies and Florida Rock, the courts used a balancing analysis to
substitute their own value judgments regarding wetland pollution and
dredge and fill for the judgments written into law by Congress. The courts'

ideas of "harm" usurped the ideas of harm that the democratic process had
put into the Clean Water Act. The Claims Court proceeded similarly in
Whitney Benefits v. United States, to' a case involving a federal ban on strip

mining coal in alluvial valley floors," ° a valuable agricultural resource."o
In Whitney Benefits, a "substantial portion" of the plaintiff's coal was located under an alluvial valley floor."' The court's takings analysis was as
follows:

[1.] [P]recedent ... teaches that in order to decide when a governmental action becomes a taking of property, the trial court must
balance two quantities. 112
[2.] On one side of the scale is the governmental and public interest in the action in question."' . . . In [the other] side of the bal107. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1344, 1352 (1991)
(quoted more fully supra at text accompanying note 41).
108. Whitney Benfits, Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989), corrected, 20 Cl. Ct. 324,
aff'd, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991).
109. Id. at 397. The prohibition was contained in § 1260 of the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 92 Stat. 448 (1977) (codified as amended at
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1986)).
110. Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at 396 n.l.
11. Id. at 396.
112. Id. (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980) (discussed infra text
accompanying and following notes 124-36))
113. Id. at 406. The court added here that when the governmental interest is aimed at
preventing "a classic nuisance," this side of the scale "almost automatically decides the issue."
The court evidently did not believe that a "classic nuisance" was involved. The court also did
not explain how the balancing it had in mind might be different from the balancing associated
with common-law nuisance adjudication. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 826-28, 830-31 (1979), cited in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,
2901 (1992).
In affirming the Claims Court decision, the Federal Circuit observed that Congress permitted some strip mining of alluvial valley floors, "indicating [Congress's] view that all AVF mining was not in itself a 'nuisance.' " Whitney Benfits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1176
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991). Both the Federal Circuit and the Claims Court
in Whitney Benefits seemed to assume that various kinds of conduct either are or are not
"nuisances"-passing right over the essential relativistic character of nuisance as "merely a
right thing in the wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). Compare W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 619-33 (5th ed. 1984).
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ance the court must place the burden, in both absolute and relative
terms, placed upon the holder of the property rights at issue.114
[3.] This case presents a dispute where a proper government purpose, protecting agricultural land, must be balanced against the absolute diminution in value of the property at issue .... 115
Congress had, of course, struck this particular balance in favor of protecting the agricultural capacity of alluvial valley floors from strip mining.1 16
The court explicitly recognized that it was delimiting the power of Congress
to achieve this protection by means of regulation (as opposed to purchase)
according to whether the balance struck by Congress was or was not the
correct balance: "The outcome of the balancing [of the public interest and
private burden]. . . answers the question: May Congress or the United
States burden the instant property without just compensation?"' 1 7
The Claims Court did not agree with Congress's conclusion that the harm
to agricultural resources of stripping alluvial valley floors was sufficiently
great to justify forbidding owners the freedom to strip and destroy such
lands. Rather, the court concluded that "the substantial public interest at
stake does not outweigh the private interest."' 18 The court's holding was, in
effect, that Congress lacked the legislative power to protect these agricultural
resources by regulation.
Although the Claims Court said that it did not "question the wisdom of
th[e legislative] balancing or the manner in which Congress sought to
achieve an equilibrium,"' 1l and that it merely was requiring compensation,
such circumlocution completely begs the question. The fundamental power
issue behind these regulatory takings cases is whether the legislative branch
has, or should have, the power to decide, "so as to bind all," 12 which uses of
land are, and are not too socially intolerable to allow. Congress decided that
scraping out coal at the expense of the agricultural surface was too intolerable to allow, 12 ' so owners of coal-bearing farmlands had to forego the coal.
The Claims Court, affirmed by the Federal Circuit, held that such a decision
was beyond Congress's reach. It was no more on point to say that Congress
114. Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at 406.
115. Id.
116. It is no exaggeration to say this "particular" balance because, apparently, when Congress adopted the strip mining prohibition in question it had the lands of Whitney Benefits,
Inc. specifically in mind. See id. at 406-07; see also Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1173-74.
117. Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at 406.
118. Id.at 417.
119. Id.; see also Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1170.
120. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660 (1887) (quoted more fully supra at text accompanying note 39).
121. Id.; see also Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at 397 (stating that Congress had acted to
"strike a balance between protection of the environment and agricultural productivity and the
Nation's need for coal as an essential source of energy").
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has the power to buy out private rights to make the socially intolerable uses,
than it would have been for the Whitney Benefits court to say that Congress
can create courts to decide what is a nuisance.
Regulatory takings doctrine is, in the end, about the scope of the legisla-

tive power to control socially intolerable conduct by simple prohibition and,
in a world of differing private views, to set overall public policy as to what is
socially intolerable. "Suffice to say that government regulation-by definition-involves the adjustment of rights for the public good. Often this ad-

justment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of
private property. To require compensation in all such circumstances would

effectively compel the government to regulate by purchase.'
V.

22

THE OSTENSIBLE AGINS AUTHORITY FOR JUDICIAL REWEIGHING

In each of the three cases described in the preceding section, Loveladies,
Florida Rock, and Whitney Benefits, the courts' willingness to embark on a
more activist review of legislative decisions is in contrast to the deference,
described earlier, of the Supreme Court's own decisions in the land use field.
Indeed, the courts' approaches in these three cases go beyond that of the
Supreme Court in Lucas which, except for "total takings," explicitly acknowledges the traditionally "broad realm within which government may
regulate without compensation."' 123 In each of these three cases, the court
found its authority for reweighing and replacing the legislative judgment in a
line from Agins v. City of Tiburon :124 "Although no precise rule determines
when property has been taken, the question necessarily requires a weighing
of private and public interests."' 2 5 But does Agins really call for such judicial reweighing of the legislatively determined balance?
The Agins language on weighing is one of the more frequently quoted, and
perhaps misunderstood, lines in recent takings jurisprudence.' 2 6 There is a
122. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (upholding a ban on sales of avian artifacts).
123. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897 (1992).
124. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
125. Id. at 260-61 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In Loveladies, the Claims Court
cited this portion of Agins as its sole authority for weighing the "public benefit against the
harm inflicted upon the landowner." Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381,
388 (1988). In FloridaRock, the Federal Circuit quoted the "weighing" language and stated
that it was "[c]onducting a similar weighing here." Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791
F.2d 893, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987). The Whitney Benefits court
likewise relied on and quoted the Agins "weighing" language as authority for revisiting the
balance struck by Congress and, based on the re-balance, decided that Congress had acted
beyond its constitutional power in regulating, as opposed to buying, alluvial valley floors.
Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at 406.
126. See, e.g., Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2911 n.11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); McDougal v.
County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 676 (9th Cir. 1991); Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc., v.
City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 177 (4th Cir. 1988).
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substantial question as to whether the Claims Court and the Federal Circuit
applied this language correctly in Loveladies, Florida Rock, and Whitney
Benefits.
There are a couple of different meanings that the word "weighing" as used
in Agins could have.' 27 One possible meaning of weighing, the one employed by the Claims Court and the Federal Circuit, is "balancing"-placing
relevant factors, interests and concerns on one side of a scale and the opposing factors, interests and concerns on the other, and then deciding the case
based on the relative "weights" on either side. However, to "weigh" might
merely mean to "consider," and the Supreme Court in Agins may have
merely meant that the question of taking requires a court to consider both
the private and the public interests involved. For several reasons, this latter
understanding, interpreting weighing as considering, makes more sense in
the Agins context.
First, to interpret weighing as balancing is to add something to the actual
words of the Court in Agins. Nowhere does the opinion say that a court
must weigh public and private interests against one another ("weigh" in the
28
sense of balance). The opinion merely says that the two must be weighed.1
Accordingly, the Claims Court in Loveladies attached a subtle but significant
additional thought to the basic Agins language when it implied that Agins
required it to weigh the "intended public benefit against the harm inflicted
upon the landowner involved."' 29
Second, the Supreme Court's analysis that followed and implemented the
weighing language in Agins did not suggest anything like "weights" for any
of the factors, interests or concerns that it mentioned, either as absolute
quantities or relatively as against the others. Following previous Supreme
Court practice in land-use cases,' 30 it merely set forth the various considera3
tions as matters of relevance.' '
127. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
128. For example, the Court merely cited (and quoted in a footnote) the City Council's
legislative findings in the legislation, and the City's purpose of protecting residents from the ill
effects of urbanization, and said: "Such government purposes long have been recognized as
assessing the fairness
legitimate." Id. at 261. At another point, the Court explained that "[i]n
of the zoning ordinances, the[ ] benefits [to the owners] must be considered along with any
diminution in market value" they may suffer. Id. at 262 (emphasis added). Neither assignments of relative weight nor counterbalancing were suggested.
129. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388 (emphasis added); see also Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at

405-06.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
131. Likewise, the Court's opinion in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), which Agins cited as "illustrative" of the weighing concept, 447 U.S. at 261, did not
contain any suggestion that it was assigning relative weights or otherwise weighing in sense of
balancing, nor did anything in the Agins opinion imply that it did. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 26162.
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Third, in its context, the Agins weighing statement looks like a simple
recapitulation of the two-prong test, which it closely follows in the very same
paragraph of the opinion.132 Like the sentence about weighing, the twoprong test specifies that a court must weigh or consider private and public
interests, namely, whether the owner has "economically viable use" (private)
and whether the regulation advances a "legitimate state interests"
(public). 33
'
From the standpoint of allocating institutional power it is no small matter
of concern how courts read the word weighing in Agins. If indeed Agins
means to require courts to review regulatory takings by substantive balancing, it is difficult to see how a court could ever do the job without re-doing
the job of the legislature. If, on the other hand, "weighing" merely means
considering, the court can do its job by merely doing what the Supreme
Court did in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Reality Co.' 34 and the decades of
cases that followed-by noting that relevant supporting factors, interests and
concerns were there for the legislature to take into account. 35 Following
this traditional approach, once a court weighs whether the legislature had a
rational basis for its balance, and whether the owner retains "economically
viable use,"' 36 the court has no further role of making sure that the legislature balanced things "correctly."
Reading weighing as considering also substantially reduces the risk that
policy balances struck by the elected representatives of the people will occasionally be replaced by the individual predilections of single or small groups
of judges. At best, judicial balancing is only a metaphor. Only in metaphor
can environmental protection weigh more than (or less than) private property rights. While metaphors can be used to convey meaning, they cannot be
used to supply meaning. Judges can use metaphors of balancing only after
they have already made up their minds on some basis other than comparative gravitational attraction.
In summary, the Claims Court and the Federal Circuit may have gone
well beyond the text and context of Agins when they set out, based on Agins,
to revisit the legislative determinations of balance in Loveladies, Florida
Rock, and Whitney Benefits. Congress already weighed the public interest in
keeping dredged or foreign material from being deposited in wetlands and
keeping alluvial valley floors from being stripped for fuel. Its statutes represent the legislative determination that such public interests outbalance owners' private interests in destroying these national natural resources by doing
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See Agins, 477 U.S. at 260-61.
Id. at 260.
272 U.S. 365 (1926),
See id. at 388; see also supra text accompanying notes 42-50.
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
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such things. Without the clearest direction from the Supreme Court, it is
hard to see why appointed judges should undertake to override the balance
arrived at by Congress.
VI.

THE No-SEGMENTATION PRINCIPLE IN THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court's narrow holding in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council "' is plainly not itself a general direction that judges should now
regard the Takings Clause as a universal license to revise the judgments of
balance made by legislatures. Without a doubt, however, Lucas is a directional change, and its new common law nuisance criterion"' is a definite
inroad into the Court's longstanding policy of deference to legislative determinations of balance in the land use field. The question is, where is this
going?
As long as it is confined to the terms of Lucas itself, the Supreme Court's
new nuisance criterion of legislative legitimacy may remain a rule of comparatively little consequence.1 39 The new criterion would only apply in the
"relatively rare situations" of total taking, the "extraordinary circumstance
when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted."'"
In most situations and under most land use regulations, the highly deferential "broad realm" rule, also ratified in Lucas, would continue to apply.' 4 '
There is reason to think, however, that the new common law nuisance
criterion of taking may not remain confined to the very limited application
initially staked out for it-or, at least, this is the hope of some on the Court.
Total takings are "relatively rare" today for only one reason, namely, the
137. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
138. Id. at 2900; see supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (outlining Lucas's nuisance

criterion).
139. Although any legislation that goes beyond the confines of judge-made nuisance law
theoretically poses a risk of successful compensation claims, it is relatively easy to inoculate
land use regulations against this impact of Lucas. Two possible techniques are (i) including a

provision for "escape-valve" variances based on extreme hardship alone, and (ii) adopting subdivision regulations that prohibit the creation of parcels that would have no economically

beneficial use unless they are altered at the expense of their natural resource values. See
Humbach, supra note 9, at 27-28.
140. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894.
141. Id. at 2897; see also supra text following note 59. Even as it was acknowledged in
Lucas, the "broad realm" may have suffered some territorial loss in footnote 8, where the

Court described as erroneous the "assumption that the landowner whose deprivation is one
step short of complete is not entitled to compensation." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8. One
possibility is that a Lucas-style categorical taking rule may be extended from total takings to
regulations whose effects fall "one step short of complete." See id. Such an extension would,
of course, immediately raise the question of protecting owners from regulatory impacts that
are "one step short of one step short"-until, step by step in a grand cascade, the whole thing
falls away and the traditional police power is a shadow of itself.
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Supreme Court's longstanding but recently questioned principle that owners
are not allowed to "segment" their property for purposes of takings analysis:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature
of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole ....142
In other words, "where an owner possess a full 'bundle' of property rights,
the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." 143 Because most parcels of regulated
land still have valuable uses "as a whole," the no-segmentation principle
prevents "total" regulatory takings from ever being anything but rare and
extraordinary.
The no-segmentation principle has applied for almost as long as the regulatory takings doctrine that it qualifies."' Nevertheless, questions about its
future vitality arose when the Lucas majority troubled itself to stray from
the facts at hand and, in dictum, declared the principle "unclear."' 4 5 The
Court gave the example of "a regulation [that] requires a developer to leave
90% of a rural tract in its natural state."' 146 "[I]t is unclear," the Court
stated, "whether we would analyze the situation as one in which the owner
has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion
of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in
147
the value of the tract as a whole."'
Actually, the Supreme Court's own precedents since 1927 could hardly be
more clear; 14 8 the hypothetical rural developer in Lucas would have suffered
no taking at all, as long as he or she had economically viable use in the
remaining 10% of the land. Indeed, the only precedent that Lucas cited to
142. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (quoting
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978)). The no-segmentation
principle was questioned by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his earlier dissents in these cases. Id. at
515-18; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 149 n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
143. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).
144. The first post-PennsylvaniaCoal case to unambiguously reject the idea that the regulatory effects on property can be validly assessed on a segment-by-segment basis was Gorieb v.
Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 609-10 (1927) (upholding setback restrictions forbidding the placement of
structures within a certain minimum distance of the street). The same principle was implicitly
involved in an earlier case, Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (upholding height limitations
for buildings), cited and followed in Gorieb, 274 U.S. at 608.
145. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. E.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497-98 (1987);
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 675 (1927); see also discussion infra note 187.
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the contrary14 9 was a case in which the segmentation issue was not even
mentioned.
What the Court probably meant in its Lucas digression was that some
members of today's Supreme Court would like to rethink the traditional
analysis of cases such as that of the hypothetical rural developer. One thing,
however, is certain. If the Court allows owners to focus takings inquiries
solely on the rights taken away (treating, for example, the right to build on
the regulated 90% as the only relevant property at issue), then the instances
of "total takings" will quickly multiply. Litigants will be able to establish
"total" takings in all but the worst pleaded cases, and the applicability of the
Court's new nuisance criterion will become the norm rather than the exception. Such an abrogation or substantial truncation of the no-segmentation
rule would, in short, transform the Court's new nuisance criterion into a
major qualification of legislatures' authority to decide public policy in the
land use field.15 o
The notion that property interests can be broken up into their component
parts for regulatory takings analysis seems to rest, like the regulatory takings
doctrine itself, on Justice Holmes's opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon." In fact, Justice Holmes's opinion did not at any point discuss
whether an owner's property could be analytically segmented for takings
purposes. The idea that Pennsylvania Coal endorses such segmentation apparently comes from a single sentence: "To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional
purposes as appropriating or destroying it."1 52 It is the words "certain coal"
that are key.
From this sentence one can infer, if one wishes, that the PennsylvaniaCoal
Court was only concerned with the "certain coal" that the owner had to
149. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), cited in Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at
2894 n.7, and discussed infra notes 151-161.
150. See Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COL. L. REV. 1667, 1677-78 (1988); see also Frank I. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967). Professor Radin coined the term "'conceptual
severance' " to refer to the segmentation idea. Radin, supra, at 1676. The issue of how to
define the "parcel as a whole" for takings analysis is not, however, necessarily limited to severances that are merely "conceptual"-though purely conceptual severance probably presents
the least tenable case for segmentation. In at least two recent cases, the Claims Court has
specifically considered the possibility of including actually severed lands as part of the "parcel
as a whole." Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334, 1345 (1992); Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 391-93 (1988); see also infra notes 167-204 and
accompanying text (discussing the Claims Court's decisions). Accordingly, in this Article, I
will use the term "segmentation," consistently with the Supreme Court's own idiom on the
topic.
151. 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922); see supra note 31.
152. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added).
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leave in place. One can. infer, as well, that the Court ascribed no particular
importance to the possibility of contiguously owned coal whose existence
153
might have permitted the owner to mine at an overall operational profit.
To draw the conclusion, however, that this one line from Pennsylvania Coal
therefore upheld segmentation as a proper analytical technique for takings
cases is to make quite a leap. The crucial factual assumption on which such
a conclusion would depend-whether there actually existed any contiguously owned profitable coal to be segmented off-was not even mentioned.' 5 4 The point simply was not discussed.55
The dissent in Pennslvania Coal did discuss segmentation. Specifically,
Justice Brandeis argued in dissent that the coal owners should not be given
immunity from these mining regulations merely because, before the regulations were imposed, the coal owners had sold off the surface rights to
others. 15 6 Justice Brandeis did not believe that an owner should be able to
abridge the regulatory power of the state "by dividing the interests in his
property into surface and subsoil."' 5 7 As authority he quoted Justice
Holmes's earlier observation that one "cannot remove [rights] from the
power of the State by making a contract about them.'" 5 8 Justice Holmes,
writing for the Pennsylvania Coal majority, was evidently not impressed.
Clearly the majority in PennsylvaniaCoal was unwilling to apply the principle of no-segmentation in the rather extreme way that dissenting Justice
Brandeis proposed-conceptually recombining subsurface and surface rights
that had been severed long before the regulatory legislation was adopted. It
was, after all, precisely because the surface owners had contracted to accept
abbreviated titles that the majority perceived the statutory mining prohibi153. The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected these interpretations of the words "certain
coal" in Pennsylvania Coal. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 498-99. However, Justice Scalia (who later
authored Lucas) dissented in Keystone, and may see the words "certain coal" differently.
154. Actually, it appears more likely than not that such profitable contiguous coal did not
exist. The gist of the coal company's claims in Pennsylvania Coal was that entire "large collieries," not individual segments of coal, had been rendered inoperable by the regulation. See
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 482-85.
155. Accordingly, the Court's later anti-subsidence case, Keystone, is not "inconsistent"
with Pennsylvania Coal on the issue of segmentation, contrary to the implication in Lucas.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2984 n.7 (1992). In Keystone the
coal companies regulated by the anti-subsidence law concededly had many other coal deposits
so there was no reason to think that their operations could not be carried on at a profit, moreover, and the existence of these other coal deposits was very much before the Court. Id. at
493-97.
156. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 419 (Brandies, J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 421 (quoting Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908)
(upholding a ban on selling water out of state)).
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tion to be such an injustice.' 5 9 The PennsylvaniaCoal majority's rejection of
Justice Brandeis's rather extreme version of the no-segmentation principle
tells us little, however, about how the Court would have viewed two other
important and distinct segmentation questions not before it. First, can an
owner convert an already existing valid regulation into a compensable taking
by subdividing his or her property interests after the use-restriction is in
place?" 6 Second, can a compensable taking be established by merely "conceptually" severing property, without any actual conveyances at all? 16
Any hint in Pennsylvania Coal that whole property interests could be
freely segmented for purposes of takings analysis was dispelled five years
later in Gorieb v. Fox.'6 2 Like Pennsylvania Coal, Gorieb does not discuss
segmentation explicitly. However, by upholding prohibitions on houses
closer than certain minimum distances from the street, 163 Gorieb made it
clear beyond peradventure that the Court was unwilling to accept claims of
loss based on mere inability to build on parts of overall buildable properties.
If Pennsylvania Coal was about "certain coal," then Gorieb was about "certain square feet." One year later, in Miller v. Schoene, " the Court upheld a
prohibition on, one might say, "certain trees." More recently, the Court has
affirmed that takings analysis cannot focus solely on certain airspace 1 65 or,
indeed, even on certain coal, as long as the owner's coal as a whole can be
66
mined at a profit.1
VII.

THE No-SEGMENTATION PRINCIPLE IN THE CLAIMS COURT

In 1981, the United States Court of Claims followed and applied the nosegmentation principle in Jentgen v. United States, 67 and Deltona Corp. v.
159. See id. at 416 (majority opinion) ("So far as private persons or communities have seen
fit to take the risk of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk
has become a danger warrants the giving to them greater rights than they bought.").
160. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988), discussed infra at
text accompanying notes 173-87, which answered this question in the negative. But cf Tabb
Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334 (1992) discussed infra at text accompanying notes
202-04.
161. This is the situation directly addressed by the statement of the no-segmentation principle quoted supra note 142 and accompanying text. See also Radin, supra note 150, at 1676
(discussing "conceptual severance").
162. 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
163. Id. at 610.
164. 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding a requirement that certain cedar trees be destroyed in
order to prevent the spread of arboreal disease to nearby apple trees).
165. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (upholding a
landmark preservation ordinance that prohibited the construction of a skyscraper in the airspace above Grand Central Terminal).
166. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493-97 (1987).
167. 657 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). The court dismissed
a taking claim based on a fill permit denial, pointing out that the owner remained able to
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United States, 68 both wetlands protection cases arising under the Clean
Water Act. 169 Perhaps anticipating an eventual evisceration of the no-segmentation principle, however, the Claims Court, in its recent holdings discussed previously, Loveladies 17 and Whitney Benefits, 1" has dealt
somewhat more flexibly with precedent in applying the no-segmentation
72
principle. 1
Loveladies, as we saw earlier, was a wetlands case in which the owner
claimed that a taking occurred after the Army Corps of Engineers denied a
fill permit affecting 12.5 acres of land.' 73 The 12.5 acres were part of an
original tract of 250 acres, most of which had already been profitably developed and sold. 174 In addition to the 12.5 acres at issue, the owner also redevelop, and still had considerable value in approximately 40 acres of his 101.8 acre tract. The
court concluded that the "case merely present[ed] an instance of some diminution in value."
Id. at 1214. The Supreme Court's decisions "uniformly reject the proposition that diminution
in property value, standing alone, can establish a 'taking.'" Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
168. 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). The facts were a
little more complicated than those in Jentgen. The owner had divided the project into five
areas and applied for fill permits for each. It received permits to fill the first two areas. Then,
when it applied for permits for the remaining 3 areas, it received only one of the requested
permits. The Court of Claims noted that the wetlands acreage subject to permit denials represented (1) only 33% of the developable lots in the owner's original 10,000 acre purchase, (2)
only 25% of the lots in the 3 areas included in the second round of applications, and (3) only a
portion of the two areas for which permits had been denied, being 111 acres of developable
uplands in those two areas. Id. at 1192. In short, by any calculus, "Deltona's remaining land
uses are plentiful and its residual economic position [is] very great." Id. Hence, the case was,
like Jentgen, merely "an instance of some diminution in value." Id. at 1192-93.
169. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); see supra note 73.
170. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 68-86.
171. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 108-22.
172. The United States Court of Federal Claims is not the only court that has dealt flexibly
with the no-segmentation principle. For example, the New York Court of Appeals recently
seemed nearly ready to accept the notion that "the permanent abrogation of [any] one of (the
owner's affected] rights, without regard to its comparative value in relation to the whole, may
well be sufficient to constitute a taking." Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d
1059, 1067 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989).
The Washington Supreme Court declared a Greenbelt Ordinance a taking because it required that "a large percentage of certain privately owned lots be retained in or restored to a
natural state." Allingham v. City of Seattle, 749 P.2d 160, 161 (Wash.), corrected, 757 P.2d
160 (Wash. 1988), and overruled by Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907
(Wash.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 911 (1990). The court found "unpersuasive" the argument that
"the City should be allowed to regulate away all rights of ownership to a portion of a person's
property, so long as some part of the property remains usable." Id. at 163. The court soon
reversed itself, however, citing such United States Supreme Court precedents as Keystone and
Penn Central, see supra note 148, and stating that the inconsistent analysis in Allingham was
"overruled." Presbytery of Seattle, 787 P.2d at 915.
173. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
174. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 383 (1988).
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tained 6.4 acres that were apparently developable,"' but due to conveyances
1 6
of intervening lands, were "no longer contiguous with the 12.5 acres.", "
The Loveladies court's regulatory impact analysis focused on the 12.5
acres alone. The court segmented the 12.5 acres, refusing to lump it together
with any of the owner's other acreage, yet it did not reject the no-segmentation principle." Instead, it concluded that the no-segmentation principle
did not apply to the Loveladies facts by resolving two open questions about
segmentation in ways that simply avoided logical extension of the principle's
application.
The first of these questions concerned land that the owner previously conveyed from the original tract: Should the no-segmentation rule apply to
lands previously subdivided and sold off when the owner is claiming a regulatory taking only with respect to lots still retained? There are reasons why
the no-segmentation principle should apply to such situations, defining the
"parcel as a whole" to include both previously disposed of lots together with
the lots retained. The takings lodestone of" 'justice and fairness' "178 does
not logically compel taxpayer largess for people who already have recouped
their original investments by selling part of their land and who have profited
handsomely in addition. There is also substantial concern to avoid rewarding manipulative subdivision strategies or what may be, in essence, selfcreated hardships " 9-considerations that especially apply if the disposition
of lots occurred after the challenged regulation was put into place.' 8 ° The
Supreme Court has not yet explicitly addressed the question of when, if ever,
previously disposed of portions of a tract should be lumped in with the
owner's remaining land in defining the parcel as a whole.' 8' Nevertheless,
the Loveladies court asserted that, "on the basis of Keystone, this court can175. Id. at 393. It was determined that one of the 12.5 acres was "upland" and therefore
did not require a permit. Id. at 396.
176. See id. at 393. In all, the owner still retained 57.4 acres of his original 250, but on 38.5
acres the owner was deemed not "able to obtain the permits needed for ... utilization." Id.
177. Id.
178. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citing Goldblatt
v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).

179. See infra text accompanying notes 214-20.
180. Cf. Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 321 (1991) (stating that because owner

had bought with notice of the permit requirement, court refused to "turn the Government into
an involuntary guarantor of [the owner's] gamble"); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d
1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (same), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Claridge v. New Hampshire
Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287 (N.H. 1984) (holding that the fact that owners bought wetland
with notice of the regulatory impediments is a factor in refusing to find a taking based on
denial of fill permit needed for development).
181. If, for example, the owner treated the sold-off and retained lands as a unified investment project, should the courts likewise treat the property as a single "whole"? Cf Ciampitti,
22 Cl. Ct. at 320. The Ciampitti court stated: "[The owner] treated all of Purchase 7, which
encompasses virtually all of the lots at issue, as a single parcel for purposes of purchase and
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not include the value of all the property originally purchased as the parcel as
8 2

a whole."'1

The second open question dealt with by Loveladies concerned the owner's
6.4 developable but now non-contiguous acres: Should the no-segmentation
rule apply to lands still retained by the owner but which, because of intervening conveyances, are no longer contiguous? The Claims Court refused to
include such "sporadically held" units as part of the property as a whole.' 8 3
The reasons given in the preceding paragraph-principles of "justice and
fairness" and preventing manipulation-also apply here. These concepts

support the logic of including lands that have become non-contiguous in the
parcel as a whole. On this point there is also some fairly clear guidance in
Keystone, where contiguity clearly was not a factor. 184 Indeed, in Keystone,
the Supreme Court even seemed to suggest at one point that the relevant
quantum of property might be as broad as the owners' "bituminous coal
interests in western Pennsylvania."' 85 In the end, Keystone defined the relevant property as "any reasonable unit of petitioners' coal mining operations
and financial-backed expectations.'86 Plainly, such a definition of the parcel as a whole does not imply contiguity. The Claims Court did not, however, consider the unavoidable implications of these portions of Keystone,
preferring instead to rely on a case from the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit that pre-dated Keystone's more encompassing defini87
tion of the parcel as a whole.1
financing. It would be inappropriate to allow him now to sever the connection he forged when
it assists in making a legal argument." Id.
182. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 392 (1988). The Claims
Court implied that the Supreme Court had decided the issue in Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), pointing out that the Court did not "include all
the property which was held at the time of the original purchase, i.e., all of the coal which was
in the ground when the property was originally purchased in the early 1900's. Rather, the
Supreme Court defined the value of the parcel as a whole as 'the value that remain[ed] in the
property' when the taking was said to have occurred." Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 392. None of
that was at issue in Keystone, however, and it is probably truer to say that the Keystone majority felt it had ample margin to support its conclusions by merely including the vast quantities
of reserve coal that the companies still had. The Claims Court's implication that the coal
previously extracted and sold could not have entered into the equation is pure conjecture.
183. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 393.
184. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
185. Id. at 496. "[P]etitioners have not claimed, at this stage, that the Act makes it commercially impracticable for them to continue mining their bituminous coal interests in western
Pennsylvania." Id. at 495-96.
186. Id. at 499.
187. American Say. and Loan Ass'n v. County of Matin, 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1981).
This case held that two portions of a parcel, zoned differently, may or may not be analyzed as
two separate parcels for takings purposes, depending on, among other things, whether the two
portions would be "treated separately at the development stage." Id. at 371. The court pur-
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In a subsequent case, Whitney Benefits v. United States, 188 the Claims
Court did not have the luxury that it enjoyed in Loveladies of being able to
distinguish the Supreme Court's precedents on no-segmentation. 8 9 Unlike
Loveladies, where the owner had severed economically viable components
from its land, the claimant in Whitney Benefits had actually added potentially economically viable components to the interest that was the subject of
its takings claim. To facilitate the extraction of its underground coal, the
owner had bought extensive areas of valuable agricultural surface land that
it could (but did not wish to) farm.' 90
The Claims Court held that a taking of the coal rights occurred when
Congress enacted a statute that prohibited strip mining in alluvial valley
floors, and the Federal Circuit affirmed."'9 The Government argued that the
strip mining prohibition did not effect a taking because, although it rendered
the coal rights valueless, the owner still had "a valuable property right in
ported to follow Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), which the court saw as supporting an analysis on a segmented basis. American Savings, 653 F.2d at 370.
In Nectow, the Court struck down a residential-use limitation on substantive due process
grounds. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 183. Although Nectow did indeed involve a single parcel divided
in legal use by zoning, it nonetheless provides no precedent on the segmentation issue because
the decision in Nectow was not based on the onerous impact of the regulation on the property,
as a whole or otherwise. Instead, the decision was based on the fact that the "health, safety,
convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants of the part of the city affected [would] not
be promoted" by the restriction. Id. at 188. Obviously, if a use restriction lacks a rational
relation to a legitimate state interest, as in Nectow, it is hardly relevant whether its illegitimate
effects apply to all or only part of a particular piece of property. The whole point of segmentation analysis, by contrast, is to establish the constitutionally relevant quantum of land so that
there is a base against which to determine the impact or economic effect of an otherwise legitimate regulation. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7
(1992).
188. 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989), corrected, 20 Cl. Ct. 324 (1990), aff'd, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 406 (1991).
189. Actually, the Loveladies court had some difficulty with a one-acre bit of non-wetland
area surrounded by 11.5 acres of non-fillable wetlands. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 396 (1988). The court's assumption was that this one-acre bit, though
not wetland, nonetheless could not be used for development given the lack of permits for the
remaining contiguous 11.5 wetland acres. Id. There was, however, no indication that a permit
for access to allow such limited construction was ever applied for. Id. Nevertheless, despite
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (requiring owner to
determine maximum allowable development by obtaining state permission to develop), the
Claims Court treated the case as ripe without requiring the owner to apply for permission to
build an access way across the wetland area to reach the one acre. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at
396.
190. Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at 397. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text
for further discussion of this issue.
191. Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1178 (upholding Claims Court award based on taking
as of August 3, 1977). This date coincides with the enactment of the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA). Pub. L. No. 95-87, 92 Stat. 448 (1977) (codified as
amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1986)).
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farming and ranching the surface property."' 92 Under the no-segmentation
principle, the Government contended, the agricultural capacity should have
been included along with the coal potential as part of the parcel as a
whole. 93
'
Instead of attempting to distinguish Whitney Benefits from the Supreme
Court's no-segmentation precedents such as Keystone, the Claims Court simply said: "Because plaintiffs are claiming only that defendant took their coal
rights, and not their surface rights, consideration of the surface rights.., as
part of plaintiffs' bundle of property rights is not warranted."' 9 4 The Federal Circuit, in affirming, likewise dismissed the analytically awkward economic potential of the agricultural surface rights by declaring that the law's
95
taking of "coal rights . . . is what, and only what, this suit is about."',
"When Congress prohibited that mining of that coal, ...
it took, all the
property involved in this case."' 96
In a way, of course, the Federal Circuit was indisputably right: If a judge
says that coal rights are the only property involved in a case, then coal rights
are the only property in the case. Such apodictic diktat does not mean, however, that the coal rights were the only property in the picture, and it is
certainly ripe for evaluation whether the judge's diktat has any basis in
principle.
The courts' approach in Whitney Benefits demonstrates that a court need
not disregard or abrogate the no-segmentation principle in order to defeat it.
Instead, the court can drastically curtail its application simply by allowing
factors within the owner's control to define the relevant quantum of property
for constitutional purposes. In Whitney Benefits, for example, the court allowed the owner's intentions for the property to supply the definition of parcel as a whole-the owner was only interested in strip mining coal; therefore,
the owner's valuable agricultural lands overlying the coal were, bluntly, not
"in this case."'t 97 According to this theory, no "economically viable use"
should ever be constitutionally relevant as long as the owner can aver that he
192.

Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at 405.

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1174.
196. Id. at 1172. On appeal, the Federal Circuit also dismissed the government's contention that the property had residual economic value for farming, calling it speculation "without
reference to the record." Id. at 1174. It was odd for the court to say this, however, inasmuch
as one page earlier the court had stated that the plaintiff had proved, as an "obvious physical
fact[ ] about the property," that "farming and ranching had long been operated on the surface
above the Whitney coal." Id. at 1173. Moreover, the Claims Court's opinion had described
alluvial valley floors, such as the land in Whitney Benefits, as "ideal" for ranching or farming.
Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at 396 n.l.
197. Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1174, 1176.
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or she is not interested in it. If courts are willing to yield to this kind of
strategy by owners who seek to gain at public expense, the no-segmentation
principle could become practically a dead letter.
The recent reception of the no-segmentation principle in the Claims Court
has not, however, been entirely negative or grudging. In Ciampitti v. United
States,19 8 for example, the Claims Court stated that "[i]n the case of a landowner who owns both wetlands and adjacent uplands, it would clearly be
unrealistic to focus exclusively on the wetlands, and ignore whatever rights
might remain in the uplands."' 99 The resulting difference in valuations was
dramatic; the wetlands were appraised at only about $3,000 by themselves
while the calculated value of the parcel as a whole was $14,000,000.200 Noting, however, that the "same analysis may not always be appropriate" to
define the relevant quantum of property for takings purposes, the court suggested that "[flactors such as the degree of contiguity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to which the parcel has been treated as a single unit, the
extent to which the parcel has been held as a single unit, the extent to which
the protected lands enhance the value of remaining lands, and no doubt
many others would enter the calculus." ''
In a post-Lucas decision, Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 20 2 the Claims
Court seemed prepared to follow the Ciampitti factors, noting that Loveladies "runs contrary to the established precedents., 20 3 The facts were complex, but the court in Tabb Lakes made it clear that it was unwilling to allow
an owner analytically to fragment its de facto unified development program
in order to create an appearance that some portions of its development had
been temporarily taken as a result of a cease and desist order by the Army
Corps of Engineers. 2°
VIII.

REASONS FOR RETAINING THE No-SEGMENTATION PRINCIPLE

Although there plainly is some Supreme Court sentiment for truncating or
eliminating the no-segmentation principle,2 °5 there are reasons for not doing
198. 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991).
199. Id. at 318.

200. Id. at 319.
201. Id. at 318.
202. 26 Cl. Ct. 1334 (1992) (another wetlands permit case).

203. Id. at 1346 n.17 (citing Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982), discussed supra at note 168, and Jentgen v. United States,
657 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982), discussed supra at note 167)).
204. 26 Cl. Ct. at 1343, 1356-57. The Corps' jurisdictional determination was later overruled as procedurally defective. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Va.
1988), aff'd, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43. But compare the Supreme Court's postLucas decision in Concrete Pipe & Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S.
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so. One, of course, is precedent. The putative endorsement of a segmentation approach in Pennsylvania Coal was unprecedented 6 and, to date, has
not been followed by the Supreme Court. Other reasons may also be posited.
One reason for continuing to treat owners' actual investment packages as
the constitutionally relevant quanta of property is that there does not seem
to be any principled basis for drawing the line elsewhere.20 7 If some owners
are permitted to escape existing land use regulations by subdividing, either
actually or conceptually, when should owners ever not be permitted to do
so? Without a no-segmentation principle, the only way to prevent a total
collapse of legislative authority to make land use policy may be to embark on
an endless series of hairsplitting decisions by which some owners are permitted to escape regulatory impacts while others are not.20 8 Lucas suggested a
test based on the degree to which "the State's law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest in land with respect to which
20 9
the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) value."
However, any right of use that a regulation has totally removed is, almost by
definition, one that has been legally "recognized" and, prior to the regulation's adoption, protected. One of the most notable characteristics of common law property, after all, is its almost infinite divisibility, the
characteristic which makes the familiar "bundle of sticks" analogy so apt.
Another reason for retaining the no-segmentation rule is to preserve what
Lucas described as "the functional basis for permitting the government, by
regulation, to affect property values without compensation-that 'Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law.' "2'0 Lucas held that this "functional basis" for uncompensated legal
change could be safely disregarded in the "relatively rare situations" of total
takings.2 1' Without a no-segmentation principle, however, the "total takings" situations would become the norm instead of "relatively rare," and a
Ct. 2264, 2290 (1993), in which the Court reaffirmed the no-segmentation principle, discussed
infra at text accompanying note 218-20.
206. Prior to Pennsylvania Coal, in Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909), the Court had
upheld a height limitations for buildings.
207. See Radin, supra note 150, at 1677-78. As Professor Michelman points out,
"[c]onceptual severance is the rock upon which [Professor Richard] Epstein grounds his argument that every restriction, not falling within a rather strictly defined nuisance exception, legally laid by the state upon property is prima facie unconstitutional, redeemable only by ...
compensation." Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1615 (1988)
(footnote omitted); see also Michelman, supra note 150, at 1229-34.
208. For a possible set of initial ground rules for such decisions, see the Ciampitti factors
quoted supra at text accompanying notes 198-201.

209. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992).
210. Id. at 2894 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
211. Id.
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requirement to compensate disgruntled owners would become the everyday
result of changes in the "general law." In other words, having a "categorical
rule' 212 of compensation for total regulatory takings functionally requires
that there also be a no-segmentation principle to keep such total takings
relatively rare; otherwise, "'[g]overnment hardly could go on.' ,213
Finally, a truncation or elimination of the no-segmentation principle
would invite manipulation by creative pleading, compensation-seeking "fractionalization, 2 14 or what may be essentially self-created hardships to avoid
land use regulations. An owner should certainly not be permitted to define a
segment of property as the only property "in the case" simply by pleading it
as such. 215 A parcel composed partly of wetlands but still able to be developed "as a whole" can be pared down to an economically "useless" piece by
selling off the profitable upland portions. 21 6 Given the frangibility and
adaptability of property interests, it should be easy work to create leaseholds
or other recognized restricted interests that are without economic use unless
challenged use regulations are relaxed.2 17 Carried to the logical end, ordinary residential zoning could, for example, be effectively "busted" by the
simple expedient of creating fee simple determinable estates limited to endure only "so long as the land is used for shopping center purposes."
Just one year after deciding Lucas, the Supreme Court has, in fact, given a
rather strong reaffirmation of the no-segmentation principle, albeit in a nonreal estate context. In Concrete Pipe & Products v.Construction Laborers
212. Id. at 2899.
213. Id. at 2894.
214. Shortly after Lucas came down, conference sponsors were already promising to tell
the land use bar: "How to use Justice Scalia's 'Footnote 7' [questioning no-segmentation] to
your advantage. How to define 'the parcel' or property unit to demonstrate 'deprivation of all
economically-feasible use;' " and presenting the question: "How to fractionalize current property holdings to discourage regulation?" Brochure for "Tactical Workshop" entitled "How to
Successfully Resolve Land Use and Real Estate Regulation Issues in the Wake of Lucas,"
sponsored by the National Real Estate Development Center in Washington, D.C. on September 1, 1992 (on file with the Catholic University Law Review).
215. Compare discussion of Whitney Benefits, supra text accompanying notes 188-97 with
Ciampitti, quoted supra note 198-201.
216. Cf discussion of Loveladies supra text accompanying notes 173-87.
217. As Professor Michelman has pointed out, the lease held by the Nollans in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (discussed supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text), gave them an option to purchase "conditioned on their promise to demolish and
replace the dilapidated bungalow" on the land, a promise that they could not keep without the
building permit that they sought from the commission. Michelman, supra note 207, at 1605
n.28. Denial of the permit would have made the option a right with "no economically beneficial use." If the continuation of the leasehold itself had been conditioned on the Nollan's
replacing the existing structure, then the Nollans would have had a possessory interest in land
with "no economically beneficial use."
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Pension Trust,2 18 the Court rejected the petitioner's attempt to segment its
property for takings purposes, stating:
[W]e rejected this analysis years ago in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,2" 9 where we held that a claimant's parcel of property could not first be divided into what was taken and
what was left for the purpose of demonstrating the taking of the
former to be complete and hence compensable. To the extent that
any portion of property is taken, that portion is always taken in its
entirety; the relevant question, however, is whether the property
taken is all, or only a portion of the parcel in question.22
IX.

SEEKING A PROPER SCOPE FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS REVIEW

The courts' approaches in Loveladies, FloridaRock and Whitney Benefits
suggest two ways in which the Supreme Court might expand the range of
judicial review in regulatory takings cases. One is to follow the Claims
Court and the Federal Circuit in their reading of Agins, treating the reference to "weighing" as a warrant for courts to redetermine the balance of
factors, interests and policy concerns behind legislative determinations. The
other approach is to truncate or eliminate the no-segmentation rule, thus
greatly increasing the instances of "total regulatory taking" and, consequently, extending the domain of the Lucas nuisance criterion that applies to
such cases. This section suggests some reasons, apart from precedent, why
the Court may decide not to do either of these.
It is inevitable that different land uses sometimes conflict with one another
and with other widely sought goals. The question inevitably arises, therefore, whether some land uses-indeed, which land uses-have negative external impacts that are, on balance, too intolerable to allow. The common
law of nuisance provides some standards, but many believe that modern conditions require a supplementary body of environmental and land use legislation to assure public and national well-being and to fulfill our ethical
obligations as a society. Others disagree and, on philosophical or pragmatic
grounds, favor free market solutions with a minimum of government regulatory supervision. 22 '
There is, in short, vast room for legitimate debate about which approach
to land use regulation is best and which particular land use regulations, if
any, serve the interests of the public and the nation. Because these questions
of appropriate land use right and wrong cannot be answered to the equal
218. 113 S. Ct, 2264 (1993).
219. 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
220. Concrete Pipe & Products, 113 S. Ct. at 2290 (footnote added).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
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satisfaction of all, there is also the question of final say: Who decides? The
Framers of the Constitution may have placed their primary faith in elected
legislatures to decide such matters "so as to bind all," 22 2 but that can be
changed.
Although many people have their own fairly definite views on issues such
as whether filling wetlands or ruining good farmland causes "intolerable"
social harm, these views are ultimately based on value judgments. They are
the very kinds of judgments that Justice Scalia presumably had in mind
when he wrote that "determination of the 'public interest' . . . entails...
value judgment., 223 In enacting land use regulations, legislative bodies must
make exactly these sorts of judgments.
Courts have to make value judgments too-for example, when legislative
direction is absent or when courts are applying some of the vaguer prescriptions of the Constitution, such as "due process of law." However, it would
be a poor constitutional strategy to give the courts the job of making de novo
the same value judgments that an elected legislature has already made under
its constitutional authority. To the extent that courts read the Takings
Clause give this task to themselves, they relegate elected legislatures to making merely "provisional" laws-subject to ratification or veto by the courts
on their substantive merits.
Professor Rose has observed that "the takings problem is so intractable"
because "[o]ur traditional discourse envisions property as serving quite divergent purposes. ' 224 Reflecting this divergence, we find many theories of
takings-arguments that courts should decide regulatory takings cases by
balancing,22 5 by well-defined rules,2 26 according to the law of torts,2 27 ac222. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887); see supra text accompanying notes 3841.
223. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1344, 1352 (1991); see
also supra note 41.
224. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 So.
CAL. L. REV. 561, 594 (1984); see also Jerry L. Anderson, Takings and Expectations: Toward a
"Broader Vision" of Property Rights, 37 KAN. L. REV. 529 (1989) (comparing the various
philosophical influences on the Framers and the modern cases); David Schultz, The Locke
Republican Debateand the Paradox of PropertyRights in Early American Jurisprudence, 13 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 155 (1991) (reviewing different background views about property rights as
reflected in developing institutions of the 19th century).
225. See, e.g., State Dep't of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., 571 P.2d 196 (Wash. 1977)
(employing balancing analysis to uphold a restriction on building); see also Michelman, supra
note 207, at 1629 (noting that "balancing . .. [is] a part of law's essence"); Radin, supra note
150, at 1684 (preferring a balancing approach with takings issues); cf. Michelman, supra note
150, at 1193-96, 1234-35.
226. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697 (1988).
227. Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1335
(1991) (on the theory that "the government must pay for what it wants in very much the same

Catholic University Law Review

(Vol. 42:771

cording to Lockian philosophy, 221 with attention to ecological integrity, 229
with attention to personhood, 230 and with a plethora of other factors, interests and policy concerns in mind. None of these are, of course, explicitly set
forth in the Takings Clause itself. 23 ' As long as they are not, they remain
factors for legislative consideration and as such, are legitimate subjects for
debate in our nation's democratic forums. What happens, however, if the
courts decide regulatory takings cases by taking into account philosophical
or moral positions that are not actually written "in" the Constitution?
Consider a specific example. Professor Fischel makes a strong case for a
utilitarian approach to land use policy decisions.2 32 He fashions a cogent
(albeit factually conjectural) utilitarian argument that, after factoring in
" '[d]emoralization costs' ,233 suffered by regulated landowners, the efficient
solution is to treat some regulatory impingements as "takings" while others
are not. 2 34 He then proceeds to criticize several of the Supreme Court's recent regulatory takings opinions based on their poor fit with his utilitarian
land-use doctrines. 2 "
Even accepting that Professor Fischel's utilitarian land use policy approach is one of the good ones, if it is not in the Constitution-specifically in
the Takings Clause-why should his utilitarian critiques be addressed to
Court decisions? They should be addressed instead to the decisions of the
legislature. Suppose it was the legislature's value judgment that concerns
about social equity, national security, or the fate of future generations outweighed utilitarian concerns in particular (or in all) situations.2 36 Should a
way that private parties must pay for their interventions with respect to existing property
rights"); see also Epstein, supra note 14, at 35-56, 110-11.
228. Epstein, supra note 14, at 31.
229. David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property:A Callfor JudicialProtection
of the Public's Interest in Environmentally CriticalResources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311
(1988).
230. Radin, supra note 150, at 1687.
231. Some of them, indeed conflicting strands, can arguably be found in cases decided
under the Clause, but for the moment I want to concentrate on the Clause itself.
232. Fischel, supra note 25.
233. A concept borrowed from Michelman, supra note 130, at 1214.
234. Fischel, supra note 25, at 1584-85.
235. Id. at 1585-89. The cases are: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825
(1987), First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987), Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
236. It is not meant to imply that a comprehensive utilitarian analysis could not take satisfactory account of everybody's concerns about such matters as social equity, security, and
future generations. After all, if it is legitimate to levy coercive taxation to compensate for
"demoralization costs" to regulated landowners, then it is presumably also legitimate to levy
taxes to compensate those demoralized by, for example, social inequities. At the moment,
however, I am assuming, as Professor Fischel seems to assume, that the applicable utilitarian
dogma would indicate a policy choice different from that dictated by a focus on such competing dogmas as equity, security and protecting posterity.
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court be criticized for not overturning the legislative judgment and elevating
utilitarian concerns over those that predominated in the value judgments
made at the legislative stage?
It seems to me that a court reviewing the constitutional validity of legislation cannot properly take "efficiency" or other utilitarian concerns into account unless the Constitution either limits legislatures to making utilitarian
laws or, at least, mandates that utilitarian concerns be a factor in legislative
choices. If the Constitution does not incorporate utilitarian philosophy as a
legislative standard, then courts, in reviewing the validity of the legislature's
acts, should not give utilitarian arguments any weight whatsoever, except to
note they are there. 237 Certainly, no extra-constitutional consideration
should ever be a ground for overriding a legislative choice.
What has just been said about utilitarianism can equally be said about any
other belief system. Advocates of utilitarian approaches to land use policy
should likewise not have to worry that a court will overturn utilitarian legislation on say, environmental grounds. To be sure, what is "in" the Constitution is not fixed. Citizens are free to advocate the inclusion of their own
philosophico-moral favorites and many, no doubt, would be delighted to see
their own favorite achieve constitutional status. Such an achievement
would, however, immunize the newly enshrined desiderata from legislative
debate, placing them above the democratic fray. This very fact of immunity
is itself a compelling reason for courts to be slow to include by decree instead
of constitutional amendment. Although we may regret that our own
philosophico-moral favorite is not in the Constitution, we can take comfort
in knowing that no one else's is either, except the policy of giving all the
right to elect and lobby representatives to embody our various views in
statute.
In sum, the facts are that "[o]ur traditional discourse envisions property
as serving quite divergent purposes' 23 8 and that courts perceive a need for
somebody to "balance" in reaching land-use value judgments; these facts are
themselves reasons to leave legislative policy decisions where the legislature's
balancing has put them. The best courts can do ex post is to substitute the
value judgment of one or a small group of individuals for that of the people's
elected representatives. 239 There is no evidence that, in questions of land use
237. See supra text accompanying notes 42-52 (describing the Supreme Court's traditional
use of this approach); see also supra text accompanying note 134-35.
238. Rose, supra note 224, at 594.
239. A skeptic of regulatory legislation can, of course, find merit even in this: "[B]y imposing a tough standard of judicial review, legislation now has two hurdles instead of one to cross.

Because most legislation is counterproductive in light of the interest group politics that generate it, the second barrier serves a useful function, even if we knew nothing about the relevant
competence of legislatures and courts in making judgments about these systems." Richard A.
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policy, the "value judgment" of the former will be better than that of the
latter. 24° On the contrary, the vast and growing body of environmental and
land use regulation is proof that the courts' system of land use controls, the
common law of nuisance, is widely regarded as inadequate.
To say that regulatory takings review ought not become a pretext for substantive revisions of legislative judgments still leaves a very substantial role
for regulatory takings review. Although it may be the classic province of
elected legislatures to keep the laws attuned to the changing times,24 the
legislature's own "determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police
powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the
courts.,

24 2

What, then, does precedent provide as the proper scope of such

judicial supervision?
A good guide to the proper scope of regulatory takings review is the case
that established it, PennsylvaniaCoal Co. v. Mahon .243 In the "takings" portion of Pennsylvania Coal,2 "4 what Justice Holmes did was simply to treat as
the generic equivalent of a physical taking that which had, in function and
effect, exactly the same result as a physical taking.245 If courts deciding
cases on the basis of Pennsylvania Coal adhere to Justice Holmes's approach
Epstein, Yee v. City of Escondido: The Supreme Court Strikes Out Again, 26 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 3, 13 (1992).
240. See supra text accompanying note 52.
241. See Mugler v, Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887) (quoted supra text accompanying
note 39); see also supra note 9.
242. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
243. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
244. The Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal breaks down analytically into two parts. In
the first part of the opinion the Court analyzed the case in substantive due process terms.
After re-weighing the legislatively determined balance, the Court concluded that "the public
interest does not warrant much of this kind of interference," and struck down (rather than
order compensation for) the legislature's mining regulation. Then the Court added a further
discussion of the " 'general validity of the Act'" in which it provided what has become the
basis of modern regulatory takings doctrine. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 483-84 (1987) (analyzing Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413-14).
For further discussion, see John A. Humbach, Economic Due Process and The Takings Clause,
4 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 325-26 (1987).
Notably, the balancing process that dominated the "substantive due process" part of Justice
Holmes's analysis, Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412-14, played no role at all in the takings
discussion that followed. The Court's effort to re-weigh what the legislature had already
weighed was, of course, quite normal "economic due process" analysis for the times-the
Lochnerian heyday of activist review. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952). However, such judicial activism is
quite contrary to the deferential "due process" review standards currently applied to economic
legislation. See, e.g., Pennell v, San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587
(1987); Day-Brite, 342 U.S. at 423 (declaring that "we do not sit as a super-legislature").
245. "To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same
effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it." Pennsylvania Coal, 260
U.S. at 414 (emphasis added).
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to regulatory takings, they will preserve to legislatures their essential role of
'
selecting "so as to bind all" 246
among the diverse competing public values
that are expressed through the democratic process.
Adhering to Justice Holmes's approach, takings would, of course, include
the entire originally intended ambit of the Takings Clause,2 47 namely, physically invasive impingements on private ownership, whether in the guise of
regulation or otherwise. For example, Justice Brennan plainly erred in his
suggestion in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 248 that a requirement ' forcing owners to grant public easements was merely a regulation on
"use. 24 9 Such a requirement denies owners the right to exclude others,
"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights" known as property,2" ° and it is therefore clearly the generic equivalent, in function and
effect, of a physical taking.251
Similarly equivalent to physical takings are regulations that go so far as to
literally reduce ownership to an essentially theoretical status with no operational consequence in the real, physical world, as appears to have happened
with respect to the subterranean coal in Pennsylvania Coal.252 Even if the
owner technically may have a right to "exclude" others, the owner's property rights are functionally gone once they cease to exist as matters of legal
or other significance. If a regulation reduces the rights to a hollow shell or
an empty hoax, then the regulation is the generic equivalent, in function and
effect, of a physical taking, and it is the logical goal of regulatory takings
analysis to treat it as such.
A regulation that removes all "value" (as distinguished from all use) can
be the functional equivalent of a physical taking, even though it is not necessarily so. Property rights can lack market value and still exist as matters of
genuine significance and even be highly prized by their owners. 253 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has now adopted a categorical rule that a regulation
removing "all economically beneficial use" is a compensable taking,254 thus
creating another significant category for regulatory takings review.
246. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887) (quoted supra text accompanying note

39).
247. See supra notes 27-28.
248. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).

249. Id. at 848-49 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
250. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).

251. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.
252. See quotation from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922), set
forth supra note 245.
253. When use restrictions remove all value, that merely signifies that current potential
buyers are only interested in acquiring the property for uses now regarded as too socially
detrimental to allow.
254. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992).
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Finally, there is regulatory legislation whose wealth redistribution effects
are not merely incidental to its legitimate public purposes but are, indeed,
the very aim of the legislation itself.255 Though seldom mentioned in the
regulatory takings context, there is firmly identifiable distinction between (i)
laws that aim to reduce social costs arising from certain kinds of human
interactions and that in the process, reallocate the burdens of such costs
among the various interacting parties, and (ii) laws that, by contrast, aim to
redistribute social fortune by imposing burdens and conferring benefits that
are unrelated to any costs arising from interactions on the part of those burdened and benefitted. With respect to the former kind of laws, whose redistributive effects are deemed "incidental" to their main purpose of social cost
reduction, the Court wrote in Mugler: " 'If the public safety or the public
morals require the discontinuance of any manufacture or traffic, the hand of
the legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any
incidental inconvenience which individuals or corporations may suffer.' "256
As Professor Coase has demonstrated, the costs arising from human interaction are not actually caused by any one party alone, but instead, are the
result of the combined actions of all participants. 2 7 There is, however, no
cardinal principle of public policy that necessarily requires all interactions
255. See, e.g., Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (striking down an attempt by state to authorize courts simply to retain interest earned on money
deposited with them by litigants).
It is said that a fear of wealth redistribution, once the people received democratic control,
was Madison's motive for proposing a Takings Clause in the Bill of Rights. See JENNIFER
NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE
MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 268 (1990).

256. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 670 (1887) (emphasis added) (quoting Beer Co. v.
Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 32 (1877)). The Court carefully distinguished laws whose "real
object is not to protect the community, or to promote the general well-being, but, under the
guise of police regulation, to deprive the owner of his liberty and property, without due process
of law." Id. at 668. Interestingly, by selecting these two paradigmatic examples, the Court
seems to be suggesting that laws restricting property use may be adopted without compensation irrespective of whether they are aimed at "preventing harm" or "providing benefits." See
supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
In the Beer Company case, the Court added that: "We do not mean to say that property
actually in existence, and in which the right of the owner has become vested, may be taken for
the public good without due compensation." 97 U.S. at 32. The Court was making a distinction between a law that takes the right to brew beer in the future and a law that takes away
existing beer that has already been brewed. Translated to the land use context, the distinction
is between the right to develop land, which may be restricted by new regulations, and a
"vested" right to maintain a previously developed use that the owner has already invested in.
See People v. Miller, 106 N.E. 2d 34 (N.Y. 1952); DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN C. JUURBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 152-58 (2d
ed. 1986); Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law §§ 6.11-.13, at 213-14 (2d ed. 1988). It is one
thing to protect property rights in something that exists, but it is quite another to provide
constitutional guarantees for hopes, dreams and expectancies.
257. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
ERGENSMEYER,
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costs to be borne by the persons on whom they initially happen to fall. Accordingly, Mugler seems correct in suggesting that the Constitution does not
limit the legislature's authority to reallocate or prevent various costs that
arise from human interactions (through laws that define torts and crimes),
even though such cost reallocations have incidental redistributive effects.25
Such "interactions cost" reallocations are pretty much the essence of social
and economic regulatory legislation. By contrast, wealth redistribution that
has no relation to particular social or economic interactions or their costs is
something else altogether. Preventing purposeful, direct redistributions of
wealth is surely a central mission and, arguably, the only mission of the
Takings Clause.
Beyond these precedential roots of regulatory takings review, however, it
is a matter of doubt whether there is further scope for judicial supervision:
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy
when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or
no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution .... There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the
substantive reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise,
the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern
the country without express constitutional authority.2 9

X.

CONCLUSION

The greatest long term importance of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council 26 may lie in the Supreme Court's adoption of the common law of
nuisance as a criterion of regulatory legitimacy. By using this criterion, the
258. Such reallocation or prevention of social interactions costs is definitely not, as Professor Epstein has suggested, merely "declaring X to be Y's debtor, and then allowing Y to collect
the sum in question" as a way to "get around the prohibitions against taking." Brief of the
Institute of Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 18, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (No. 91-453), reprinted in 25 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1233,
1246. Professor Epstein's observation would be correct only if it could be said that justice
requires the burdens of social interactions costs to remain with the parties on whom such costs
first fall.
For a more detailed and sympathetic elaboration of the grounds for not treating interactions
cost reallocations as compensable takings, see Sax, supra note 37 (discussing the general problem of cost allocation among conflicting resource users, suggesting a framework for analyzing
such cost allocations, and positing a judicial role limited to preventing discriminatory or capricious regulations).
259. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986). The Court was writing of the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, but the stated rationales apply to
the Takings Clause as well.
260. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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judiciary will be required to substitute its own judgments of right and wrong
for that of the legislature in the land use field.
In several recent cases decided prior to Lucas, the Claims Court and the
Federal Circuit had already begun to treat regulatory takings claims as occasions for revisiting, and rebalancing, the various public and private factors,
interests and policy concerns embodied in acts of Congress. In these opinions, the courts also took a somewhat grudging approach to the no-segmentation principle, which suggests takings analysis should consider regulatory
impacts with respect to parcels "as a whole." The Supreme Court in Lucas
expressed doubt concerning the no-segmentation principle.
Although Lucas restricted application of the Supreme Court's new nuisance criterion to cases of total regulatory taking, a truncation of the nosegmentation principle would allow takings claimants to focus solely on the
particular rights "totally" taken by regulation, while ignoring the owner's
other valuable rights in the same property. The result would be to expand
greatly the range of cases in which courts could revisit and re-balance legislative rationales, substituting their own policy judgments, if different, for
those of the legislature.
The question is, where is this trend going? Are recent Claims Court and
Federal Circuit decisions leading the way for the United States Supreme
Court, as it appears from some of the more innovative speculations in Lucas,
or are they wandering astray? If indeed they are leading the way, we are
headed for a new era of unprecedented judicial activism in the land use field,
an activism that may revolutionize traditional conceptions of the legislative/
judicial division of labor. Whether or not one calls this new activism "imperial," 26 ' it needs to be taken seriously.

261. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2882 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(borrowing a term from Justice Scalia, the author of the Supreme Court's opinion in Lucas);
see supra text accompanying note 2.

